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Abstract
Somaliland’s peace and security-sector reform has largely been dictated by the early
peace conferences (1991-2000) and framed its legal system to reflect its experiences with
statebuilding. Customary law (xeer) stems from clan/kin networks and reflects local knowledge
held by clan elders in adjudicating issues between and among clan families. Today it largely
functions as a dispute resolution mechanism. Common law was inherited by the British colonial
experience that ended in 1960 with the union with Somalia. Shariah law is more loosely applied
and reflects the Islamic identity of many Somali communities but has rarely been recognized as
‘official’ law till Somaliland’s constitution elevated its status.
This paper looks at Somaliland’s transitional justice process and the role that legal
pluralism has played in shaping its attempts at justice and security-sector reform. By utilizing
concepts like hybridity and the everyday, this paper frames these processes with an
understanding that while legal pluralism has established Somaliland’s peace and security
infrastructure, it has created opportunities and challenges for marginalized and vulnerable
groups. Such challenges include accessing and participating in legal reform initiatives that
support social transformation. This paper concludes with the need to frame transitional justice,
from the onset, in a way that recognizes the importance of communities as the site of
transformational justice.
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Chapter One
Introduction: Transitional Justice and Security-Sector Reform in Post-Conflict contexts
The transition to peace can be fraught with periods of violence as society works to return to
‘normal.’ That distinction between a violent past and more peaceful present is an important
discussion for researchers of post-conflict societies. The understanding that violence is a
continuum was popularized by researchers studying gendered violence during and after conflict
and emphasizes the need to better study violence from prior to the advent of conflict through to
the post-conflict period.1 Somaliland’s post-conflict process is certainly unique – even in an
African context – in the way that traditional authorities (clan elders) have acted as drivers of
peace. The establishment of a system of governance and constitution that melds customary and
common law is an exercise in legal pluralism that has succeeded for over twenty-five years. This
is remarkable especially when contrasted with the experience with peacebuilding in Southern
Somalia - nearly twenty internationally organized peace conferences, with that country only
emerging from ‘transition’ with the selection of Hassan Sheikh Mahamoud as Somalia’s first
president in 2012 to replace the transitional federal government that emerged from the Arta
Conference in Djibouti (2000-2012).
The grassroots and culturally-rooted development of Somaliland’s peace process has
spawned research on hybrid forms of governance and the role they can play in building
sustainable peace.2 The scholarly preoccupation with the systems in place that uphold
Somaliland’s institutions can often overshadow the role that local communities have in securing
1
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and maintaining peace on a daily basis. By looking at local communities’ desire to return to a
sense of normalcy, the value of concepts like ‘the everyday’ or ‘everyday life’ become important
scholarly tools of analysis. My own experience of Somaliland’s peacebuilding process came
through my time there beginning in 2011 with frequent trips till 2016.3 At the time, I was
conducting research with women’s rights organizations, groups and activists, and questions
beyond my research agenda came to the fore. These included finding ways to make sense of the
means and tools that post-conflict societies used to re-establish peace and security after violent
conflict. My interest in the notion of ‘everyday life’ as foundational to peace and security was
taking shape and through this lens, women’s contributions to peacebuilding became even more
significant when, at the time, I was interviewing women peace activists and civil society leaders.
While interviewing Somaliland women for my PhD research, I found that women’s rights
groups and organisations used grassroots advocacy strategies to demand an end to conflict and
advocated for greater gender equality. This included holding peace rallies where women sang
songs and poetry demanding that violent attacks end and that women be given equal opportunity
to participate at these peace conferences. During my time there in 2012, women civil society
leaders frequently stated that because women were largely excluded from Somaliland’s early
peace conferences (1991-1997) as delegates and voting members, their capacity to demand
gender equality was limited; although a few women attended they were given observer status.
These early peace conferences were significant for women because they established xeer
(customary law) as the primary method for dispute resolution during the transitional justice
3

My PhD field research was from the fall of 2011 till the summer of 2012 where I collected data in Hargeisa, Burco,
Gabiley and Sheikh in Somaliland. I returned in 2013 and 2014 for the Hargeisa International Bookfair each trip last
a month. From 2014 till 2016 I was working on a research project with an INGO based in Nairobi where I did
frequent trips to Mogadishu and Hargeisa with each trip last 2-3 weeks at a time. At this time the research project
was closely related to my PhD research, relating to women’s experiences of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction
with an emphasis on women in South-Central Somalia.
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process. Xeer is led by clan families and Somaliland’s peace conferences were largely organized
around five major clan families. Xeer (customary law) has a wide reach and serves as a code of
conduct between two (or more) disputing clan families. It is largely unwritten and as such texts
will not give us insight into the real impact of xeer on Somaliland’s peace process. Instead, the
impact may be seen through the accumulation of everyday social practices.
Searching for ways to understand how unwritten codes of conduct impact social and political
life led me to scholarly works related to ‘everyday life’—a term popularized by Henri Lefebvre
in his Critique of Everyday Life (1961). Critiquing capitalism, Lefebvre contends that everyday
life is the site at which processes reproduce and sustain themselves (specifically ‘consumption’
in relation to capitalist modes of production). Since his seminal works, everyday life has been
taken up as an analytic category by geographers, sociologists, anthropologists, legal scholars and
political scientists. Lefebvre’s three volume Critique has opened up dialogue and discourse on
how to understand local communities through everyday practices that constitute what may be
considered ‘normal.’ The everyday interests me in relation to post-conflict societies and
peacebuilding given that scholars tend to focus on macro-formulations of peace processes
(commissions, negotiations, political transition) and less on the daily or ‘everyday’ practices that
contribute to sustainable peace. While macro-level peace initiatives are still very much relevant,
the micro-level experiences of peacebuilding needs greater attention. In the Somaliland context,
this focuses the attention on clan-based peacebuilding processes, grassroots organizing by peace
activists, and locally driven attempts to pursue legal reform by all these actors.

3

Research Question and Thesis Outline
This section outlines my approach to transitional justice in Somaliland and focuses on the
way in which the ‘everyday’ can be used to understand justice and security-sector reform during
the early peace process. My research questions directly relate to the processes and experiences of
justice and security-sector reform in Somaliland –a legally pluralistic environment. Moreover,
the interaction between community-led justice initiatives and state-run reconciliation processes
are juxtaposed to emphasize the importance of community in transitional justice processes to
legal reforms that have a significant impact on local experiences of justice. Consequently,
agency for communities in articulating, resisting, and negotiating legal reforms in post-conflict
societies ought to be given greater weight intellectually as well as empirically. This thesis
concludes that without integrating transitional justice with everyday experiences of justice and
security-sector reform in communities and addressing social inequalities and other forms of
exclusion, the capacity for sustaining peace will be diminished.
The concept of the ‘everyday’ here is applied to practices and norms surrounding the
establishment of the justice and security sector in Somaliland. Focusing on these sectors can add
insight into the intentions that early peace negotiators and participants had when instigating a
reform process that included customary (xeer), Shariah and common law into its constitution. By
framing ‘everyday justice and security’ in the context of these larger peace processes, this thesis
looks at both macro and micro-level experiences of peace and security. I ask: Who were the
principal actors in initiating these reforms? What were these processes? How do we understand
legal pluralism in Somaliland? And lastly, how can the concept of the ‘everyday’ help us
understand the role of communities in reforming the justice and security-sector in Somaliland. I

4

believe that through assessing the everyday, the level at which society interacts to engage in
these transactions, contestations and compromises, it is possible to begin to answer some of these
questions.
The thesis is divided into four chapters: the first outlines the methodological and theoretical
approach including the way I utilize concepts like the everyday and its relationship to
peacebuilding through ‘hybridity and hybrid forms of governance.’ This chapter also identifies
my approach as oriented by an engagement with local communities as important stakeholders in
peacebuilding but also as a source of legitimate authority. The second chapter outlines the
scholarly debates surrounding the development, application and understanding of transitional
justice in post-conflict societies. The contention between international human rights norms and
locally-oriented justice processes illustrates the global dynamic between peace and security and
community-derived processes (i.e., truth commissions vs. culturally-derived forms of
reconciliation).
The third chapter provides a background of Somaliland’s transitional justice process and
focuses on the role of clan/kin networks on justice and security-sector reform. The relationship
between Somaliland’s transitional justice experience and its legally pluralistic environment stems
from the series of negotiations conducted between clan/kin networks to ensure that institutions
like the judiciary, police and military are functional. This chapter contextualizes the
understanding of everyday justice and security in relation to Somaliland’s transitional justice
experience and interrogates the judicial and security-sector reform laws. The fourth chapter
focuses specifically on transitional justice processes and the interaction of global-local processes
to frame justice and legal reform in the context of social transformation. This chapter highlights
the distinctiveness of African states transitional justice processes, emphasizing reconciliation

5

over retributive justice and the role that customary forms of dispute resolution have had in
facilitating this reality. Somaliland’s experience is not unlike many other African states—
although it is an unrecognized state—yet it is still unique. This thesis concludes that without
taking into account notions of the ‘everyday’, practices that stem from communities will be
ignored and sustainable peace –including participatory forms of engagement—cannot be
adequately understood or achieved. More specifically, it is at the community-level that social
transformation can be most acutely felt.

Defining the ‘Everyday’
The notion of ‘everyday justice/security’ in Somaliland allows us to examine more closely
the interaction between customary laws and state laws in a legally pluralistic environment.
Everyday justice has been explored in a range of disciplines and this thesis will draw from law
and development, socio-legal studies, transitional justice and African studies to inform the
analysis. An especially helpful definition of ‘everyday justice’ has been articulated by Waldorf
(2017) and this thesis utilizes it thus:
Everyday justice is all about how ordinary people avoid, negotiate, and resolve the
myriad disputes that form part of everyday life so as to co-exist. Put differently, it is how
people produce justice in everyday life, drawing on their understandings of state law,
customary law, spiritual practices, and normative beliefs.4
By bringing together research surrounding community-led justice, hybrid forms of
governance and the notion of the ‘everyday’, I arrive at an analysis of Somaliland’s transitional
justice process that allows for a high degree of compromise and coexistence between xeer,
Shariah and common law. Understanding the notion of ‘everyday life’ (and by extension
everyday justice/security) in relation to the law (thereby impacting the perception and practice of

4
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justice and security) is best articulated by Sarat and Kearns (1995). They distinguish between the
constitutive and instrumental perspectives of ‘law and everyday life’ (or law in everyday life).
Instrumentalists view the law and everyday life as distinctive spheres of influence. However, a
constitutive perspective of law and everyday life suggests that “social life is run through with
law, so much so that the…law shapes society from the inside out, by providing the principal
categories that make social life seem natural, normal, cohesive, and coherent.”5 The law as it
impacts social and political life is constitutive of social values, norms and practices. It is
relational and comprised of experiences that are often understood as necessary i.e., justice
requires procedures, processes, rules around fairness and equality. Similarly, everyday security,
as Higate and Henry (2010) point out, maintains the same features and may be understood as
“…important because it can provide nuanced insight into…[how] security practices are seen, and
in turn how these (usually taken-for-granted) practices contribute towards perceptions of
security.”6 This is key in that perceptions of security and justice are highly social –impacted by
social and cultural norms. The notion of the ‘everyday’ encompasses all aspects of these norms
and social life, thereby sustaining legitimacy for any post-conflict regime.7 This thesis defines
‘everyday justice and security’ similarly –as constitutive of Somaliland’s norms and values while
perpetually (re)shaped by communities (whether based on kin networks, professional
associations, advocacy groups and other non-state actors).
Somaliland is an appropriate case study for how everyday justice and security operates
and impacts legal norms. During its transitional governance period (1991-2000), reconciliation
did not involve truth commissions or tribunals, rather clan/kin networks held local conferences
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(1992, 1993, 1997) to re-establish social ties broken by war and conflict during the Somali civil
war (1981-1991). Customary law (xeer) and norms derived from Shariah were utilized to
promote restorative justice (rather than retributive justice) principles as well as form the basis for
constitution-building.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I outline Somaliland’s transitional justice experience, providing a
qualitative review of Somaliland’s police, military, and judicial reform processes, focusing on
Law No: 24/2003; the 1963 Military Code; 2012 Police force Bill in order to highlight the
interaction between xeer (customary law), Shariah and common law and consequently the
experience of ‘everyday justice and security.’ The texts of these documents are available online
and have been oft utilized by the advocacy organisation the Somaliland Human Rights Center. I
use these online sources recognizing that xeer is unwritten but discursively communicated.
Critical engagement with these texts will help with documenting the changing norms and values
in this society to understand how ‘everyday life’ impacts justice and security-sector reform.
These reports were vital to assessing structural and systemic inequalities including those brought
about by the use of customary laws. As is often noted, xeer is rarely written down and
implemented by a select few clan members. This makes it difficult for ordinary Somalilanders
who participate in xeer proceedings to adequately challenge rulings. This has a profound impact
on the everyday experience of justice and security for the most marginalized communities.
The popular narrative that emerges in the historical accounts of this transitional justice
experience deemphasizes accounts of contestation and violence (despite the presence of both).
Using the ‘everyday’ as an analytical guide helps to fill that gap by recognizing the presence of
violence during transitional justice processes; the promotion of hegemonic norms and the
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socially constructed experience of peace, justice and security. It also requires us to ask: What
does reform mean? How is justice perceived and experienced by communities?
This thesis is guided by those scholarly works that have uncovered the contradictory as well as
complementary ways in which diverse legal systems can co-exist but also contradict one another
depending on which system is used and when. While the pursuit of justice does not necessarily
entail the absence of violence, obscuring their relationship to one another is misguided and
impacts the interpretation of the law on everyday life in post-conflict societies.

The Everyday and Hybridity: An analytical lens
This thesis situates hybridity in the context of weak and fragile statehood placing
emphasis on “indigenous institutions that create local forms of order.” 8 By contrast, the literature
on legal pluralism, as Reyntjens (2016) notes, can cover a wider array of interactions between a
“normative system” and “…individuals, individuals and institutions and between institutions.”
Legal pluralism can potentially cover intersections across the spectrum of “human behaviour.” 9
This thesis is looking at a very narrow set of interactions with respect to legal pluralism in
Somaliland (between shariah, customary and common law) as it relates to hybrid governance
(namely the use of xeer and Islam as a cultural basis for shaping norms that give rise to
institutions and practices). In essence, hybrid governance refers to understanding the experience
of using localized and indigenous practices to promote peace and justice in the Somaliland.
Social and political pluralism are among the ideals that transitional justice scholars and
practitioners seek to promote in post-conflict societies. International legal scholars and
institutions emphasize conditions for power-sharing that include pluralism as a mandate. In

8
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Reyntjens, 2016, p. 347
Ibid, p. 350
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practice, this can equate pluralism with independent spheres of influence (the socio-political on
the one hand and the legal on the other hand). Treating these practices as separate processes for
post-conflict rebuilding treats local communities and the state as independent forces. In reality
hybrid forms of governance (socio-political as well as legal) have existed in diverse social
contexts since the establishment of the modern global political order. More specifically, when
scholars refer to ‘hybridity’ in the context of post-conflict societies, the language refers to
“hybrid-forms of governance associated with local patterns of politics, [and] a post-liberal form
of peace, [where] the liberal and the local meet each other on the ground, reach and modify each
other.”10 There are key points that ought to be recognized in this iteration of hybrid governance
that impacts post-conflict contexts.
In my analysis, hybridity emerges when it is acknowledged that international norms have
a presence and yet, local communities maintain agency over how ‘peace operates on the ground.’
Transitional justice operates at this intersection – among socially diverse communities that
deploy hybridized forms of governance (i.e., TRC’s, community courts as well as hybrid courts).
The use of the term ‘hybrid forms of governance’ refers to legally pluralistic societies that apply
internationalized forms of governance (rule of law) but localized understandings of legal norms
and values (including shariah and customary law) are still utilized. How do we as scholars then
begin to make sense of disparate legal systems, communities and norms?
The ‘everyday’ is a useful orientation in both colloquial and analytical ways to
understand legal norms and values in hybrid forms of governance. Applied to our understanding
of local communities and how they operate in post-conflict societies, we are taking into
consideration everyday social realities, as well as the way in which they are reimagined. 11 This

10
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can include studies on the relationship between informality and the state, the role that markets
play in shaping liberalism in post-conflict societies, and the shifting nature of legal norms. The
‘everyday’ and ‘hybrid forms of governance’ are not euphemisms for culturally rooted or even
notions of ‘community’. Rather, as Richmond (2011) notes it is difficult to ‘manufacture’ hybrid
forms of governance or social contexts, and that contestation and agency are mutually coconstitutive. Consequently, hybridity has come to redefine the practice of transitional justice and
other forms of peacebuilding and security-sector governance. As Richmond (2011) highlights:
…internationals realised that they had to forge relationships with customary actors and
elders, negotiate tradition and traditional sites of power and social, political and
economic organisation…and in the process they encountered acute alterity which
challenged liberal value systems and norms, and institutional arrangements. Some
internationals withdrew from this confrontation, others ignored it, and others engaged.
Implicitly, these encounters have challenged and modified local and international peace
systems.12
Without critically engaging with the ‘everyday’ to understand these negotiations and
compromises, we cannot begin to understand the ways in which the concept allows for
communities to act as legitimate brokers of peace. Moreover, incorporating local perspectives
becomes critical to moving away from the dichotomy of community vs. state interests. In
instrumentalizing hybridity, as scholars and practitioners, the concern is that we may lose the
“understanding of local agency and the ability [for]…local and international actors to produce
unexpected outcomes.”13
Conceptually, the ‘everyday’14 largely referenced the social construction of urban life and
the way in which ‘space’ and ‘spatiality’ enveloped the urban subject in an environment where
they exercise contestation and compromise simultaneously. Taken up by geographers and urban

12

Richmond, supra note 10 at 133
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14 More specifically ‘everyday life’ first posited by Henri Lefebvre’s Critique of Everyday Life
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planners, the scholarship on the ‘everyday’ has since grown to encompass a broader
understanding of social reality that incorporates critical theories of space and spatiality while
exploring ‘everyday life’ more ethnographically. Its utility can be felt when scholars discuss
inequality and the hierarchies that are being dismantled to make way for greater equality.
Peace and conflict scholars have again reimagined the ‘everyday’ to include the ways in which
social realities are reconstituted in the wake of conflict and the process of generating and
inculcating norms and values acceptable to post-conflict societies. Without taking into
consideration the presence of hybrid forms of governance, engaging with notions of ‘everyday
life’ cannot be so easily discerned.

Understanding Transitional Justice in post-conflict societies
Transitional justice as an approach to post-war rebuilding utilizes rule of law, peace and
institution-building to support the transition to functioning and viable legal and political
institutions. Accountability measures feature prominently in these processes, without which
justice as a tenet of peacebuilding cannot be achieved. Regimes and/or individuals enacting gross
human rights violations must be held accountable for society to transition from conflict to
sustainable peace. Embedded in these transitions are accountability processes that include
rebuilding legal institutions and customs to evaluate wrong-doing and accord appropriate
punishments.
However, considering the variety of abuses that can occur, the diversity of repressive
regimes and the wide range of socio-political conditions in societies at war or emerging from
conflict, it can become difficult to predict which transitional justice tools will prove successful in
practice. For this reason, theorizing about transitional justice and predicting appropriate remedies
has remained a difficult task for scholars. Grodsky (2009) considers this issue by pointing to the
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variables that scholars have utilized to assess the practicality of transitional justice tools. Power
is a reoccurring variable that features considerably in the literature from the birth of transitional
justice during the post-World War II to the end of the Cold War era. This includes the ways in
which one group of elites is supplanted by another group thereby ensuring accountability for one
group and a sort of ‘transition’ from the prior regime for incoming political elite (victors justice).
Universalizing transitional justice tools can be difficult to do since what a successful transition
ought to look like would merely entail transposing western democratic ideals onto diverse
communities. In case studies emerging from the Balkan states at the end of the Cold war, human
rights abuses were so widespread among diverse factions during conflict that accountability (and
blame) could equally be shared. 15
While the way that power operates is certainly an important variable and motivation for
ensuring accountability measures are in place, it is insufficient as the sole variable to assess the
value of transitional justice as a study and in practice. Grodsky (2009) proposes a “transitional
justice spectrum” that emphasizes method over and above positing an overarching theory of
transitional justice.16 Their interest lies largely in assessing causation among a diverse set of
practices in order to “impose greater clarity on what, and subsequently how” transitional justice
is empirically assessed. The need to determine some methodological approach for how and why
transitional justice can become most effective is a preoccupation for scholars and practitioners
with ‘accountability’ present as an important variable for societal transformation and peace.17
The role of the state as the driving force behind reconciliation and rebuilding is still a
dominant feature, as well, in the analysis of transitional justice practices. Grodsky (2009) insists
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that scholars must veer outward and consider local communities as equal stakeholders and
powerbrokers during periods of transition, in an attempt to displace the scholarly dependency on
the state as the sole arbiter of accountability in post-conflict societies. 18 The state is still
necessary, particularly given that immediately after a war institutional capacity is weak or
absent. Contestations that arise in addressing human rights violations can give rise to competing
narratives. The state is best equipped to navigate transitions from violence since it is capable of
“individualizing blame” and thereby ensuring accountability on a limited set of actors or
group(s).19
At the very least, the state must be seen to be concerned with enforcing accountability
measures whether it includes criminal prosecutions or truth commissions. The new regime’s
capacity to enact justice allows for a degree of distancing from the previous regime’s actions as
well as to legitimate its own authority. More telling is the scholarly focus on power as inevitable
given the role of the state and the emphasis on elite dynamics – especially how incoming regimes
enforce accountability.
The relationship between accountability and power forces a narrow assessment of regime
change, whether punishments are favoured or if restorative justice practices are utilized. For
Grodsky (2009) power alone as a relative concept is insufficient as an analytical foundation for
measuring the success or failure (and indeed study) of transitional justice initiatives. The choice
to single out one factor, in determining variables that contribute to the type and approach of
transitional justice is attractive. Still, there is no foundation that exists to champion one variable
above another – rather many cross-cutting variables exist in different forms across diverse postconflict societies. Political elites, institutions, intelligence and other security-sector actors, as
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well as the wider community are all relevant in different ways when transitional justice is
utilized. Empirical approaches like Grodsky’s (2009) are important in identifying variables
across a broad set of practices to provide a comparative analysis.
The lack of an overarching theory of transitional justice makes it difficult to speak in
categorical terms. But that has not dissuaded scholars and policymakers from prescribing
conventional approaches that include some mix of prosecutions and amnesties – but the real
impact of these decisions can influence an incoming regime. For example, the incoming regime
may target a former regime using prosecutions or amnesty to legitimize themselves as well as
weaken the leadership of the former regime. 20
It is worthwhile asking then, what should be the goals and aims of transitional justice in
post-conflict societies? Is it the pursuit of accountability for perpetrators? Societal healing and
reconciliation? State building through strengthening justice and security-sector institutions?
Community-centered development? Sustainable peace? At various levels, scholars agree that
many of the above issues are key to the wellbeing of post-conflict societies.21 Still, much of
transitional justice is grounded in legal principles and foundations without often reimagining
alternatives to rule of law approaches to securing justice. Socio-legal theorists and critical legal
scholars have often cited the gap between normative approaches to the ‘law’ and the daily lives
of communities. Even more, the law can sometimes obscure its origins, particularly as Western
legal thought is predominately applied to post-conflict societies in non-Western states.
For Rowen (2008) the premise that “ideal-type societies” can exist and facilitate “mutual
interests” is false. Even in Western democracies, the exercise of democracy is ongoing rather

20
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than something that has been achieved without the input of future generations.22 Indeed, consider
the basis for legal authority in any society and the source can be traced to the way in which
communities organize themselves rather than the view that the law exists without the impact of
social or political processes. Consequently, “rebuilding community should be of primary
importance in creating a legal system in a country emerging from violence” and can only be
strengthened by incorporating legal authority that is more or less contextualized to post-conflict
societies.23 This leads us to consider ‘how is legal authority organized in any given community?’
By asking these questions the role of transitional justice may be better understood. The goal is
not to propose a constructivist approach to the study of ‘law’ but to suggest that we take a
broader approach to the way in which laws impact societies and communities.
By understanding the source(s) of authority as Rowen (2008) suggests the “law can
contribute to community as well as serve as an authority.”24 An examination of the way that
communities utilize legal authority can dispel the notion of universal ideals regarding the role
that laws can play in post-conflict societies. International human rights norms – of which
transitional justice is an extension – emphasize the importance of establishing rule of law after
violent conflict but communities may already possess mechanisms for redressing violent acts and
abuses. This is significant since it allows for communities to consider alternatives to trials or
criminal prosecutions.
Restorative justice practices (truth commissions, testimonials etc.…) certainly aid in
bridging gaps between state capacity and local forms of legal authority. The emphasis is placed
on the way in which legal authority is necessary for social cohesion. Rowen (2008) and Leebaw

22

Rowen, 2008, p. 93
ibid
24
Ibid, p. 95
23

16

(2008) highlight that social relations are impacted by more than legal authorities when it comes
to establishing peace and cohesion after conflict. Indeed, in the Somaliland example, transitional
justice processes stemming from the international legal order were largely absent. Much of the
rebuilding required for social order and an end to conflict stemmed from local clan families and
kin networks. As violence spread from inter-clan conflict to intra-clan conflict, clan families
sought pathways to reconciliation to avoid the complete deterioration of communal (social)
relations. In such cases where legal institutions and customs cannot be divorced from social
conditions, legal authority that stems from community and social organizing has a very
significant impact on how the law operates. Rowen (2008) considers a positivist approach
wherein legal systems are impacted significantly by communities in the case that “rules for rulemaking and social relations” are present.25 While reflecting on Hart’s Concept of Law Rowen
(2008) views this process as indicative of the “rule of recognition” whereby
…social rules and customs form the primary rules by which people order their daily
lives. The rules become law when an authority, validated through secondary rules which
determine who has authority-known as the rule of recognition-deems the rules to be law
and enforces them as such. 26
This is especially appropriate with communities emerging from violent conflict that involve kin
networks or where social bonds form the basis for legal and political organizing. The debate here
is not whether the ‘law’ exists outside of or beyond social relations but through this “rule of
recognition” any “legal system is an authority that is successful at promulgating directives that
tell people how they ought to behave.”27 As such, the measure of success as Grodsky (2008)
seeks to emphasize, is not merely where authority resides without consideration for how it
operates but the measure of legitimacy that any authority has in communities abiding by its
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directives.28 This perspective gives a wide breadth of legitimacy for authority that stems from
diverse sources; potentially coexisting in competing or complimentary ways (i.e., legally
pluralistic societies). The reliance on “social facts that become sources of law” is an indication
that everyday life can lead to the development of legal norms and customs that are authoritative
and sustainable.
Cases that illustrate the importance of re-establishing community norms and values in
post-conflict societies exist but providing a means to comparatively understand their emergence,
application and suitability to providing forms of justice and healing are difficult to ascertain.
Unless we view these cases (i.e, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Bosnia etc….)
individually, what can scholars suggest in the way of policy or legal prescriptions on transitional
justice tools and strategies that can be widely utilized? Here Rowen (2008) asks us to distinguish
between form and function – that is, the norms and values in communities that have the potential
to form the basis of legal authority and the actual exercise of this authority.29
The gap between transitional justice mechanisms and their suitability for diverse contexts
involves primarily viewing transitional justice as not only ‘ideals’ to aspire to but a means to
“create community.”30 Rowen’s (2008) concern is the way in which those in power subvert the
ideals of transitional justice to “create a self-serving narrative.”31 This skepticism is appropriate
given the wide scale purge of prior regimes that can accompany political transitions after violent
conflict. An approach to transitional justice that is context-specific but can build upon the
foundations of tools and strategies that have been deployed over time can be useful to bridging
this divide between top-down institution-led justice vs. bottom-up community-led justice.
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Scholars have agreed on many occasions that it is important to democratize transitional justice in
order to provide alternatives to the prevailing top-down approach and promote sustainable
peace.32
The debate surrounding the impact of legalism in or on transitional justice processes,
includes what both Rowen (2008) and Grodsky (2008) appeal to –greater pluralism, as a
preferred alternative norm to guide the practice and application of transitional justice. My
approach to transitional justice involves paying critical attention to this dichotomy between
strictly legalistic approaches vs. socio-political approaches. The literature is dominated by
international human rights legal scholars and their over-reliance on legal and universalistic
notions of rights and the inviolability of those rights. McEvoy (2007) rightly states that
“transitional justice discourses are themselves still ‘in transition.’33 As rule of law is deeply
rooted in the ‘ideals’ that are articulated throughout transitional justice processes, the
politicization of social life is also endemic to the practice of forming legal norms and customs in
post-conflict societies. The experience for many communities emerging from violent conflict is
rarely discussed at the intersection of these divergent processes despite the reference by scholars
to the complexity of transitional justice whether through institutional or community-focused
processes. More specifically, as Rowen (2008) emphasizes, there is no legal authority without
community. As such, understanding the communities and social realities of post-conflict
societies – prior, during and after conflict – is as relevant as considering the appropriate legal
measures to take to re-establish rule of law. The resonance that social life can have on the
development of law (in form and function) is essential to the ways in which compromises and
negotiations occur to end violent conflict but also help promote more equitable social relations.
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Searching for Community in post-conflict societies
Communities can animate concepts of ‘law’ and ‘justice.’ Recognizing that social
relations, boundaries, and the roles of community members are always in flux, cultural norms
and values are used as strong foundations for post-war rebuilding. Gacaca courts and Ubuntu
principles of reconciliation are frequently cited forms of community-building to transitional
justice contexts.34 It is worth asking what other forms of social organizing exist at the
intersection of community-building and transitional justice procedures. Hinton’s (2010)
definition of local justice is apt here: “local justice [as] concerned with the ways in which justice
is experienced, ranging from village-level interactions between former victims and perpetrators,
to offices of nongovernmental organizations, to the courtrooms of international tribunals.”35
In essence, local forms of justice directly impact and are impacted by internationalized forms of
delivering justice in post-conflict societies (tribunals, national courts). Nevertheless, it cannot be
said that post-conflict societies impose their ideals on the way in which transitional justice is
conceptualized at a global level. Rather, the agency of these communities can be seen through
the ways in which they resist the internationalization of their localities.
Hinton (2010) cautions scholars against overemphasizing the agency and power of
communities in a scenario where transitional justice is superimposed from the outside. Instead,
he asks us to consider the ways in which the norms of transitional justice have produced
“shrinkage” within these communities.36 Social relations become reduced to “manageable (and
often controllable) categories” where victims and perpetrators are easily identifiable but more
importantly these relationships are frozen in “zero time by which past and present are
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foreshortened and reframed.”37 The complexity of community relations is dismissed or obscured.
Categories of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ are not always fixed—like in cases of ethnic social
division and violence in Rwanda. Hutus and Tutsis are framed as both victims and perpetrators
depending on the perspective of the narrator. The detriments of ignoring the complexity of
communities is wide ranging and can deter transitional justice initiatives.
This view of how to do transitional justice with respect to communities has become
largely outdated despite the origins of transitional justice as a sort of ‘victors justice’;
popularized by Western Europe’s post-World War II Nuremberg trials designed to punish former
Nazi soldiers. As such, it is worth asking, how the law treats communities during transitional
justice processes where ‘law’ refers to the way western legal thought dominates transitional
justice principles and values, operates and is integrated into post-conflict societies.
As Hinton 2010 notes:
…people are seemingly transformed into liberal subjects, as autonomous citizens imbued
with freedom, equality, and rights [engaging] in democratic, social, juridical, and political
practices. Thus, in a trial, due process rights are afforded to defendants, while judges,
lawyers, and monitors work to ensure that proceedings accord with international
standards.38
For Hinton (2010), this process can have a profound impact on the “social body.”39 The
community member is distanced from their previous relationship to others (and the state) and
placed into their new role as citizen-subjects. It does not displace post-conflict social relations –
that is, it does not absolve perpetrators from criminal prosecution. Rather, this process seeks to
offer post-conflict societies a break from the past and from the grievances that led to violence.
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While this may resemble some of the ideals of transitional justice as it is theorized, the
complexity of social relations and the environment they are embedded in is not engaged with.
Hinton (2010) proposes framing “justice in the vernacular” of local communities to better
reflect local norms and values. The Gacaca courts and Ubuntu are emblematic of this and have
given rise to considerable scholarship in this area. What Hinton (2010) references as
“vernaculariztion” is often noted as complex, incoherent and requires a high degree of
negotiating. Undoubtedly, this process is contentious “as the meaning and form of transitional
justice idioms are mediated, appropriated, translated, modified, misunderstood, ignored, or even
rejected in everyday social practice.”40 It is at this site (community, local) and in this process of
translating transitional justice (i.e. vernacularization) that illuminates everyday justice. More
particularly, these tensions underscore the hegemony of internationalized conceptualizations of
justice, especially when contrasted with the norms and values of local communities.
Another preoccupation of the search for community-oriented justice is the focus on the
state and its legitimacy. Indeed, the source of any successful transition, by orthodox standards, is
the state’s capacity to effectively govern and re-establish rule of law. Promoting a ‘bottom-up’
approach to counteract this statist perspective has certainly been proposed in the past.41 The
emphasis is to decentralize “decision-making over the design, remit, conduct, character, and
outcomes of the transitional justice process to members of a given community affected by
violence.”42 Common examples include Rwanda and Northern Uganda with the valorization of
community-centered justice initiatives touted as a viable alternative to state power. O’Rourke
(2008), however, cautions against dichotomizing the benefits of justice as either state-centric or
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community-oriented and instead recognizes that violence and inequality may be perpetuated at
the community-level in equally violent ways as the state.43
The reality of competing stakeholders (community, the state and non-state actors) in the
transitional justice process enables certain groups to take advantage of conflicts that arise over
how to establish and enforce rule of law. These “meta-conflicts” may be more substantial in their
reformation goals i.e., a call to reorganize social hierarchies responsible for the outbreak of
conflict including gender inequality. Meta-conflicts between the state and local communities are
only as helpful as they allow for meaningful contestations to occur.44 For example, as
O’Rourke’s (2008) emphasizes, meta-conflicts that can help transform gender relations in postconflict societies are positive and fundamental to establishing equity. The community as a site of
contestation is crucial to acknowledging that social hierarchies cannot be used as a “stabilizing
force in society” to the detriment of radical social reorganizing.45
An emphasis on pursuing greater pluralism in transitional justice approaches has been
championed by community-oriented actors and advocates as a means to ensure power and
authority are decentralized. This pluralism can take the shape of increased representation for
marginalized groups, enshrining legal pluralism, and establishing autonomy for communityfocused justice. Contestation in the form of competing discourses on social and political
organizing is inevitable. It is also necessary to further these pluralistic aims and will likely
continue after the establishment of rule of law and governance in post-conflict societies. The
degree to which post-conflict societies can support contestation depends on the level of shared
power among political elites and between community-based actors. While the goal is a
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successful transition to sustainable peace, an acknowledgement that sites of contestation can coexist in peaceful post-conflict societies is crucial. The (contested) complexity of the relationship
between peace, equity and rule of law in a post-conflict society needs to be understood as
qualitatively no different from other forms of dissent and contestation seen in democratic
societies.

Community-building in pursuit of transitional justice
Communities rely heavily on forms of social organizing that can maintain harmony and
cohesion among members, yet in some of the most violent conflicts (i.e., Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Somalia) social exclusion was pervasive prior to the outbreak of conflict. Without first fortifying
these communities with inclusive political cultures, the values that are espoused by transitional
justice initiatives risk furthering the gap between rule of law and localized justice. The collapse
into violent conflict is certainly related to a lack of cohesion among community members. Mani
(2005) adds to that by underscoring that “transitional justice often cannot and does not produce
the by-product of reconciliation” (i.e., healing, solidarity). 46 The ‘justice’ that is sought within
transitional justice continues to frame community members as either victims or perpetrators (as
noted above). This raises a critical issue, namely: where do community members who exist
outside of this paradigm go to seek justice and healing? Delivering justice and embodying justice
can diverge in terms of their aims and aspirations.
While delivering justice is more easily recognizable through instituting rule of law, the
embodiment of justice is more akin to community-building as a means to provide a foundation
for reconciliation. Mani (2005) advocates for incorporating reparative justice principles to
invigorate value-driven local justice; with added measures for “an inclusive civic national
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identity and thriving political community.”47 Indeed, unless reconciliatory measures are taken in
conjunction with punitive acts, transitional justice will remain divisive. Mani’s (2005) approach
includes emphasizing a “survivor-oriented” ethos to veer away from the victim/perpetrator
distinction.48 This is valuable and necessary since it points to the tendency for transitional justice
approaches to encase practices and identities through temporal boundaries. Reparative justice
seeks to extend itself beyond this as means to contribute to the ongoing process of ‘communitybuilding’ as a continuum that extends beyond the end of formal conflict.
The history of transitional justice and its bureaucratic, western legal approach has
certainly proven to be inadequate in sustaining viable peace and rule of law in many post-conflict
societies. Its relative successes are also apparent, especially in drawing attention to the need for
establishing a critical assessment of legal systems and structured inequality prior to the outbreak
of conflict. Whether arguing for a reparative or transitional justice approach, the disproportionate
responsibility that communities now bear for facilitating restorative justice mechanisms is
becoming more and more apparent.49 This practice by transitional justice practitioners to transfer
responsibility for restorative justice onto communities is oversimplifying the “complex human
needs, expectations and experiences related to justice and reconciliation.”50
The use of ‘community’ as a metaphor for all things local, informal and connected
reduces members to monolithic entities that exist to serve justice in post-conflict societies.
Conflict and contestation are frequently rife after violent conflict and to varying degrees,
community members may seek to redress past harms through a combination of strategies and
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tools.51 What can emerge thereafter is a relationship that is co-constitutive and interdependent
among the state and communities, rather than mutually exclusive.52 The disjuncture between the
‘local’ and the state was present from the early manifestations of nation and state-building (postcolonial states emerging from conflict inherited colonial legal traditions). The transformations of
communities through various political iterations of statehood cannot be ignored and then called
upon in the aftermath of conflict in the name of reconciliation and peace. Community-building as
a form of re-establishing justice and peace is an approach that needs to be centered in transitional
justice approaches that do not instrumentalize the role of communities (i.e., as the site of
restorative justice measures).
Rebuilding communities should be seen as nation-building since community-building is
important to rebuilding all social and political institutions in post-conflict societies. Indeed, as
Lambourne (2009) notes, given the histories of post-conflict societies, there has always been
some form of pluralism in their legal traditions (including informally). To avoid romanticizing
communities, it is important to recognize that retributive justice may be taken up by communities
in the same way that restorative justice mechanisms may be utilized by states in a pluralistic or
hybrid approach (i.e., Truth and Reconciliation Commissions; Hybrid courts). This experience
has been more instructive for many post-conflict societies than the literature indicates.53
Ultimately, the notion that hybrid political communities utilize diverse legal norms means that
the relationship between community and the state is constantly evolving. The goal is to perhaps
evolve in a direction that ensures rule of law while managing culturally significant legal values.
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Chapter Two
This chapter outlines the disconnect between transitional justices’ ideals and its
outcomes. I will argue in this chapter that the development of transitional justice has been
heavily influenced by the normative frame of internationalism which is itself a western legal
framework. It is this application of universalist western ideals in the context of complex, postconflict and legally pluralist societies in the global South, that, in my assessment underpins the
disconnect between the ideals and the outcomes of transitional justice in these settings.
Transitional justice practice has roots in post-WWII courts (i.e., Nuremburg trials) and
suggests that Western legal thinking dominates its approach and practice on post-conflict
societies. The conflicts of the 1990s and post 9/11 emphasis on global security has shifted the
lens away from stable Western democracies to global South countries mired in conflict and
political instability. However, with the advent of international institutions to promote human
rights, justice and accountability, new discourses emerge about the role of alternative forms of
seeking justice in post-conflict contexts. This includes reconciliation tools and bottom-up
approaches to justice. This chapter concludes that transitional justice has since been adapted
accordingly and while its values and ideals are still globally promoted, the case of Somaliland,
for example, can be better understood. While Somaliland cannot claim to exist in isolation of
international legal norms, its transitional justice process was largely bottom-up and has had little
influence from the international institutions.
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The emergence of transitional Justice as normative practice in post-conflict societies
Contemporary transitional justice practices emerged from international humanitarian law
(IHL) stemming from the Geneva conventions (1949)54 and the Hague conventions (1899 and
1907)55 that helped frame the rules of engagement among enemy combatants as well as the
treatment of wartime prisoners and non-combatants. Other considerations helped develop IHL
standards and norms including customary international law. Mitigating the rules of conduct
during wartime, IHL and transitional justice methods have established a necessary legal
framework allowing the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other international tribunals to
assert authority over war criminals with criminal prosecutions. Scholars continue to debate about
the relationship and distinction between (IHL) and international human rights law. While this is
not a central debate for this thesis, it is worth noting that much of the literature on transitional
justice does utilize both and they are seen as complimenting one another.56 Transitional justice
more specifically concerns itself with redressing human rights violations in transitional or postconflict societies. The list of rules and processes to transitional justice in practice, stemming
from IHL norms, is negligible in the way that post-conflict societies experience and engage in
transitional justice. Instead, a holistic approach is usually taken in contemporary experiences
with transitional justice that draw from international and local legal traditions.
The distinction between contemporary and historical experiences of transitional justice is
relevant since it points to the changing global dynamic of states, the international legal order and
the capacity to deal with human rights violations particularly at the end of the Cold War. Charles
Call (2004) refers to this period of justice-seeking as a part of the “third wave of
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democratization” beginning with the “…end of the Cold war [and] largely sparked by the
advocacy of human rights organizations.”57 It was at this time that transitional justice as a
research inquiry began to gain resonance with scholars and activists evolving from “a human
rights instrument of democratisation to becoming an essential aspect of post-conflict transitions
and peacebuilding interventions.”58 As a staple of peacebuilding processes, the UN definition of
transitional justice notes the importance of scale in societal and political transformation. As
global and regional conflict grew increasingly violent and protracted the UN sought to
emphasize the impact of dealing with “large-scale past abuses in order to ensure accountability,
serve justice and achieve reconciliation.”59 In this way, scholars point to the inherently political
foundations and principles of transitional justice processes that include interest-based groups
vying for power.60 Historically, as transitional justice in practice is linked to the Nuremberg trials
post-WWII, the notion that political considerations impose upon what may be seen as legal
processes is apt. Even truth commissions are laden with conflict, discord over narratives, and
trauma. What is memorialized is often a political process of “what is included or left out.”61
Given these complexities, it is worth asking what if any benefit can transitional justice processes
bring to a society emerging from conflict or dealing with vast human rights abuses?
Transitional justice cannot attempt to resolve complex conflicts and heal societal rifts, not
unless other tools are utilized to support its initiatives. Indeed, it is intended to function in
consort with other features of peacebuilding (i.e., negotiations, disarmament, demobilization,
reintegration (DDR), security-sector reform etc…).62
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It is this relationship between peacebuilding and transitional justice that can often blur the
distinction between strictly legal processes and those associated with societal change (at the
community-level, for example) as well as the politics underlying it. Traditionally, for transitional
justice to effectively challenge past abuses and conflict, an internationalized approach has
prevailed. Technical experts and legal expertise are utilized to strengthen rule of law whereas
peace processes engage with a broad spectrum of institutions and practices from the local to the
national to build sustainable peace. These processes are occurring simultaneously in post-conflict
societies so to understand them as distinct spheres of influence is misleading. Rather, as Ruti
Teitel (2003) notes, the evolution of transitional justice reveals an important relationship
between justice and peace:
over time, [there exists] a close relationship between the type of justice pursued and the
relevant limiting political conditions. Currently, the discourse is directed at preserving a
minimalist rule of law identified chiefly with maintaining peace [my addition].63
Teitel’s work has significantly shaped the field of transitional justice scholarship by extending
our understanding of transitional justice as having gone from “regulating international conflict to
regulating intrastate conflict as well as peacetime relations…” 64 It is this assessment by Teitel in
how they outline the evolution of transitional justice, that is helpful in showing the rise of
intervention on the basis of protecting human rights – an approach that has shaped legal
developments in the field as new political contexts emerge impacting upon the way that
transitional justice operates in post-conflict societies.
Teitel’s work (2003; 2005) on developing a genealogy of transitional justice in relation to
global political processes lays out a chronological as well as a thematic outline for how to
understand the global and local developments of transitional justice. Beginning with the
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Nuremberg trials, Teitel’s framing is useful in outlining the various political motivations of
global actors (whether they were allied forces in WWII or the ICC during the Milosevic trial). As
well, Teitel’s usage of ‘phases’ is a useful way to link the relationship between justice and peace
in the contemporary literature on transitional justice. What is understood as the first phase refers
to the Nuremberg trials following World War II as well as the level of internationalism brought
on by the trials. The second phase is chronicled from the 1989 “wave of democratization,
modernization, and nation-building” that was occurring after the Cold War. The third phase,
occurring at the turn of the twentieth century, is heavily influenced by what Teitel views as the
“conditions of persistent conflict which lay the basis for the generalization and normalization of
a law of violence.”65
Transitional justice in this frame is acutely felt at times of extreme political and social
upheaval. The persistence of conflict and the role of international proceedings continues to shape
the currency of justice-serving initiatives. For example, a series of “justice-packages” regularly
feature in peace settlements and negotiations for post-conflict societies.66 Without the acceptance
and insistence of the international peacebuilding regime, justice-sector reform and transitional
justice priorities reflect these reforms often at the expense of local populations.67 These
conditions cannot exist without recognizing the strength of the global legal order over and above
the sovereignty of post-conflict states.68
In this third phase, the imposition of concessions relating to transitional justice measures
on post-conflict societies has become the norm. This is directly related to early interventions of
WWII where “national justice was displaced by international justice” whereby post-WWI’s
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national trials in Germany yielded an inadequate means of deterrence.69 As such, international
accountability becomes and important aspect for transitional justice processes in post-conflict
societies.70 Moreover, while this analysis emphasizes internationalism, Teitel cautions against
reframing it as justice for justice’s sake, instead indicating that the early Nuremburg trials were
seen largely as a means “intended to justify and legitimate Allied intervention in the war.”71
Similarly, contemporary intervention strategies deploy protection of human rights to justify
international accountability standards. To account for this internationalism, the post-WWII era
emphasized the need to strengthen rule of law.
In Teitel’s (2003) genealogy the importance of context is reiterated as the evolution of
transitional justice across post-war Europe demonstrates that values and political conditions
cannot be reproduced. Moreover, transitional justice became heavily associated with
international legal norms.72 The implications for post-conflict societies throughout the third
phase is evident. For scholars of transitional justice, Teitel’s critique centers on the enormous
role that international legal norms can have in profoundly re-shaping national contexts. It is
worth enquiring then about the role of a national/local justice-sector in being able to hold
individuals and groups accountability for human rights abuses. The standards of accountability
have shifted to reference international conventions that were solidified post-WWII including the
Geneva convention. As such, the internationalism that Teitel (2003, 2005) and other scholars
highlight is an enduring feature of transitional justice.73
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Internationalism is also in conflict with local and national justice-centered institutions with many
local communities seeing them as more legitimate than state institutions.
The emergence in the third phase of transitional justice practices includes the presence of
hybrid courts (incorporating international and national legal experts in dispensing justice) which
have gained prominence over time. The legacy of successive transitional justice practices
demonstrates the importance of context and challenges the duplication of tactics in diverse
political environments. Modernizing transitional justice means focusing on strengthening
national/local justice institutions in post-conflict societies to support succeeding regimes. In
Latin America, particularly in the aftermath of Argentina’s Trial of the Juntas (1985), the trial
was a means to empower the newly elected democratic government. The role of national trials
can ensure accountability (at least in the eyes of the successor regime) and justice serving
institutions can remain intact – albeit with new judges and prosecutors. Whether national or
international, transitional justice as a paradigm was normalized, particularly in relation to postconflict contexts and wherever political instability was frequent over a period of time. The
influence of the international legal order can be found in the way that post-conflict states
organize their justice-sector institutions. In fact, as conflicts and instability dominated the postSoviet states that emerged after the Cold War, so too does jurisprudence based upon
International Humanitarian Law [IHL]. International Humanitarian law is consistently linked to
pervasive conflict (in light of human rights abuses), and as Teitel (2005) notes, what emerges is a
“continuum between the local and the transitional” in how transitional justice is dispensed with.74
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Accelerated by transitions in Eastern Europe, Africa and Central America, what Teitel
terms as Phase II of the evolution of transitional justice is an emphasis on nation-states’
development of rule of law. Rule of law in these dynamics refers to the normalization of IHL
especially its universalizing language. Indeed, transitional justice in contemporary practice
cannot be divorced from the language of human rights. New norms were also introduced during
this period including that of amnesty for violators depending on the scale of violence enacted by
perpetrators. For many scholars 75 transitional justice during periods of instability in states,
reflected the pragmatism that was perhaps needed to achieve peace and the complexity of
imposing prosecutorial justice; allowing for “multiple [conceptualizations] of justice” to
emerge.76
The conditions for compromise that are required to end conflict and secure political
transitions are almost inevitably imperfect. Certain factors contribute to these conditions
including the state of justice-serving institutions (courts, police and military forces) after conflict,
the scale of abuses perpetrated by violators, and the extent to which the state was involved as the
primary contributor to political violence.77 Pragmatism as a feature of peacebuilding is well
established especially in the way that political settlements can heavily influence the shape of
important institutions including those in the justice-sector.78 In the context of transitional justice,
this pragmatism is far reaching, particularly in the way rule of law is conceived of – as a tool of
successor regimes to purge detractors and preceding agents from ongoing reforms. It is difficult
to conceive of this as less than punitive especially if criminal prosecutions are pursued. New
laws are enacted, judicial dismissals become frequent and rule of law dilemmas abound.
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Phase II (post-1989) periods of transitional justice recognized this particularly among
those states where weak judicial systems were in place and where instead other mechanisms
were utilized, including amnesties.79 Phase II was exceedingly contextual and limited in its
replicability and unlike Phase I, in the post-WWII period, internationalism gave way to national
sovereignty with varying degrees of success.
In moving away from strict uses of criminal prosecutions, post-1989 post-conflict
societies and societies in transition utilized alternative methods for pursuing justice and securing
peace that privileged what some refer to as “law and society responses.”80 What emerges is a
restorative model of justice that emphasizes truth over justice and prioritizes victims above
offenders. Often captured through truth commissions (a tool of restorative justice)—“an official
body, often created by a national government to investigate, document and report upon human
rights abuses within a country over a specified period of time.”81 Truth commissions were first
used in Argentina and popularized in post-apartheid South Africa in the 1990s where peace and
reconciliation was the priority.82 It is through truth commissions that we can see the role and
accountability of communities and groups taken above that of the individual. Truth commissions
seek to emphasize notions of justice, fairness and accountability at the community level, as well
as the overall goal of identifying perpetrators, victims, historicizing grievances and producing a
national account of gross human rights violations.83
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This process of using truth commissions, which seeks to preserve peace rather than
promote punitive justice, impacts how transitional justice operates. Transitional justice in the
context of truth commissions focuses on the victim and serves primarily as a pathway for the
victim to address and heal in some way from past grievances. Truth commissions utilize dialogue
and has been widely touted as a successful alternative to criminal prosecutions that are more
retributive in nature.84 As well as contributing to enhanced agency for victims, restorative justice
practices, like truth commissions, has shown offenders are less likely to re-offend. Overall,
restorative justice has shaped transitional justice to become a vehicle for dialogue between
victims and offenders. Unlike the first iteration of transitional justice, the 1990s experience
promoting restorative justice values, actively shaped notions of legitimacy by devolving power
to local communities and their understandings of justice. While positive and negative outcomes
can come from this practice, the Rwandan use of Gacaca courts is a prime example of ways to
enhance local voices while legitimizing legal standards and norms set by the ruling government.
Ultimately, the “problem of judgment” more commonly associated with retributive justice was
less favoured.85 Restorative justice practices sought to deemphasize the strictly legal norms and
practices that dominated to allow for psychological, theological and other moral considerations
to drive the transitional justice process.
This second phase (post-1989) was truly transformative by expanding the number of
actors and agents involved in transitional justice initiatives. This included churches, civil society
organizations and human rights groups that all work largely outside of conventional legal
processes and systems. For example, testimonials became confessionals with an “ethical-
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religious discourse.”86 Guilt was established through moral understandings of responsibility and
accountability that were largely outside of the legal domain, and while this was a function of the
role that participating local actors/agents took on, the state had to establish norms consistent with
democratic governance (i.e., devolving legal authority to non-state actors). Nevertheless, local
actors, not represented by the state, became central figures in critiquing the globalizing nature of
previous transitional justice practices. As well, the tension between local and community-level
practices of transitional justice and the international legal order continues.
The contemporary experience of transitional justice (post 9/11) – globally can be best
characterized by the presence of civil war, political instability and longer periods of
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Considering the origins of transitional justice in
the post-WWII era where extraordinary conditions were necessary to warrant legal and political
intervention by Western allies, weak states and “war in a time of peace” has normalized
transitional justice as a necessary component to democratic governance.87 The consequences of
this, as scholars indicate, is the increasing politicization of the law and the impact that has on
entrenching global legal norms onto nation-states. The ICC has a permanent place in the practice
of prosecuting war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. For Teitel (2003) this
represents an “expansion on the law of war” effectively challenging the local practices of justice
that emerged in the mid-1990s.88 The implication is that fragile and weak states where small
conflict and civil strife were rampant cannot be relied upon to effectively uphold rule of law
standards. The individual, state legal order and global legal order come in direct conflict with the
ruling regime. Leaders are considered directly responsible for war crimes and crimes against
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humanity. These processes are complex, not unlike the case of Serbian leader Slobodan
Milosevic. This resurgence of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) sees transitional justice
revert to a discourse that is utilized to justify intervention.
Among the first instances of intervention on the basis of human rights abuses is the
NATO intervention in Kosovo as a “humanitarian basis for [a] just war.”89 Scholars are swift to
highlight that this basis for intervention can offer a form of transitional justice that is used to
justify the prevention of current and future human rights abuses.90 In the context of transitional
justice, particularly its aims and evolution, the conflating of international human rights law
(IHRL), criminal law and the law of war muddles the effort towards challenging states that are
culpable in human rights abuses. Contemporary transitional justice does not revert to post-WWII
era principles and practices, rather the justification for international intervention on the basis of
IHRL co-exists with the increasing politicization of peace and justice initiatives in post-conflict
societies. Moreover, the broadening of humanitarian intervention in the case of the war on terror
is a departure from the foundations of IHRL. While this paper does not explicitly focus on the
war on terror, it is worth noting that the political and legal environments that the state operates
within are displaced by external (global) pressures to align with the militarization of justice in
the name of the war on terror.91 More importantly, transitional justice in principle is still
considered a post-conflict tool and is difficult to utilize as a pre-emptive measure to ensure
justice and security. As Teitel (2003) notes, “any attempt to generalize from exceptional postconflict situations in order to guide politics…becomes extremely problematic.”92 So, as
transitional justice tools including both criminal and restorative practices become normalized in
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contemporary global politics, the importance of context and local agency becomes more
apparent.

Transitional justice in post-conflict African States
Transitional justice initiatives that are implemented in African states generally occur after
“negotiated transitions”, meaning that an end to the conflict does not necessarily accompany
regime change. For example, the Lome Accord in Sierra Leone was the third such agreement to
bring about a cessation of conflict among warring factions.93 Bosire (2006) is right to ask “what
constitutes a transition”; particularly in the African context? Even in the Somaliland context,
transitions in the form of legal and political reforms are ongoing. In this sense, transition as
outlined by international humanitarian norms is far from many African experiences with
transitional justice. Bosire (2006) advocates for legitimating a transitional justice project that is
sustainable and reflects the institutional capabilities of war-torn societies while recognizing that
not all experiences are devoid of international assistance or involvement.94
While the experiences of African states transitioning from conflict are complex, many do
fall into the category of “weak states [experiencing] unclear transitions, [with]… frequent resort
to transitional justice measures.”95 For instance, prosecutions traditionally have a role in
transitional justice processes especially in cases of widespread human rights abuses. But in weak
and fragile states, the difficulty of holding trials or bringing together experienced and competent
judges and a general environment of poor legal capacity makes it extremely challenging to
ensure criminal prosecutions will be fair and successful. Somaliland’s courts were in an abysmal
state in immediate post-conflict period with few to no qualified judges familiar with the British
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or Italian legal codes. Rather, many of those that were considered judges (clan elders) were those
familiar with xeer.
Examples are plenty when it comes to African states and their experience with
transitional justice. Rwanda experienced an eruption of violence and civil war in the 1990s and
its transitional justice process has been well documented. In the aftermath of the Rwandan
genocide, legal professionals were few and far between with perpetrators vastly outnumbering
these professionals. In the 2000s, Rwanda had an estimated 125,000 perpetrators in detention.96
With this enormous imbalance, the judicial system can be overwhelmed. Perpetrators were in
many instances serving jail terms “without ever being convicted.”97 Consequently, to deal with
the lack of capacity, traditional and community-oriented courts arose - the Gacaca court system
was formally established to deal with the backlog but more importantly give agency to
community-level mediation processes. Similarly, in Sierra Lone, post-war infrastructures like the
judiciary were nearly absent or dysfunctional. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (a hybrid court
– made up of international and local adjudicators) was established in part due to this break down
in judicial capacity. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), another ad hoc
court indicted 80 individuals believed to have masterminded the most heinous elements of the
genocide, but among those only 20 were convicted along with 3 acquittals.98 This outcome
suggests that while hybrid courts may be effective in dealing with capacity issues in the
aftermath of violent conflict, they do not guarantee accountability for all perpetrators. Moreover,
the role of the ICC has been heavily criticized particularly as it relates to the prosecution of
African heads of state. Still, even if cases were to be referred to the international body, other
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issues limit its effectiveness (ability to prosecute) including the “security of the country…[and]
state cooperation.”99
Other approaches like truth commissions have been utilized in transitional justice
processes across different African states. Commissions though, operate in a similar fashion to
formal courts and prosecutions and are dependent upon an institutional infrastructure that may be
non-existent or limited in some way. Truth commissions are seen as able to fill that “impunity
gap” where victims are not only able to recount their experience with conflict/violence but
perpetrators can also be identified. Recommendations tend to stem from these commissions and
range from reparations, institutional reform and/or further prosecution.100 The mandate of any
commission involves both developing an historical account of the events as well as producing a
final report that is seen as authoritative and legitimate. Yet this can prove to be a highly
contentious and politically imbued process. For Bosire (2006) these commissions “must be seen
to be moral, just, representative, consultative, credible, and open to public scrutiny.”101 That is an
enormous task for any institutional body and whether or not the Truth Commission is granted
independence in their mandate is a key part of success. Mandates are often negotiated during
peace agreements by elites with little to no input from those victimized by widespread violence
and abuse. A second concern with the legitimacy of truth commissions can include the
commissioners themselves and the political nature of their appointments. Sierra Leone’s truth
commission was seemingly allied with the ruling party.102 The issuance of the final report also
lends truth commissions a finite mandate and time to complete their work that may be less than
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ideal for participants – victims and survivors alike. While reparations and other forms of
compensation may be recommended, enforcement lies with the authorities in power.
Reparations are another tool of transitional justice that serve specific goals. First, they
seek to prioritize victims and the violent dispossession that occurs during conflict. Second, they
can serve to demonstrate state authority and action in the area of reparations owed to citizens,
third, to rebuild trust between citizens and state authorities and lastly to establish social cohesion
among the disenfranchised and victimized.103 Ideally, this transitional justice mechanism
operates in an integrated manner with truth commissions, otherwise reparations can quickly be
seen as bribes and forms of coercion aimed at silencing a victimized citizenry. In the short term,
as the case in South Africa, reparations can offer immediate relief from such extreme conditions
of poverty and depravation. Yet, the funds that were to be distributed by the Committee for
Reparations and Rehabilitation (CRR) in South Africa were nearly two years delayed, amounts
were much lower than anticipated and distribution frequently caused tension between community
members that received them and those that did not.104 The Sierra Leone truth commission’s
recommendation that payments be made for “amputees, the wounded, women who suffered
sexual abuse, children and war widows” is a recognition of the compound victimization that
occurs during and after conflict.105 Reparations have been made in this case in the form of
pensions, skills-training or other social benefits. 106 There is also growing resentment that
rehabilitation efforts have been aimed at perpetrators in Sierra Leone. As such, there is a
disconnect between truth commissions that prioritize victims and programs geared at
reintegrating perpetrators into wider society rather than prosecuting them. Reparations are often
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cited as necessary to ensure the mandate of any TRC is seen as legitimate and a source of
empowerment for victims.107
Underlying all of the preceding is the question of political will to enact these measures; a
major concern during periods of transition. The issue of ‘vetting’ those in any new regime for
human rights abuses may prove difficult when political elites are entangled in perpetrating these
same abuses in the name of war and conflict. This makes it nearly impossible for new political
settlements to entrench themselves without discarding a vetting process. Consequently,
legitimating any government will be a concern in cases where a large proportion of those in
government are seen as perpetrators. This is no more evident than in the security-sector, as the
army and police are generally implicated in human rights abuses. Sierra Leonean security forces
were heavily connected to the war and in the TRC’s final report it noted that “the army was
responsible for the third most institutional violations of human rights.”108 Reforming the
security-sector was highlighted in the Sierra Leone’s TRC report but can require an incredible
mobilization of political will and resources in order to professionalize former guerilla fighters
and pay salaries of security-sector forces more regularly. Taken together, approaches to
transitional justice that include truth commissions, reparations etc… means that the degree of
complexity embedded in processes of transitional justice can be unending even after the formal
end of conflict. Somaliland’s process was entirely dependent upon local communities’
willingness to participate as well as diaspora members contributing funds towards the peace
conferences. Are the outcomes of negotiations done in this way less legitimate in comparison
with hybrid or internationalized approaches to transition? It is this experience of community-
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building and ‘everydayness’ in Somaliland that is not too dissimilar from transitional justice
experiences of Rwanda, Sierra Leone as well as South Africa.

Transitional Justice in a socio-legal context
Since its inception, transitional justice has become a readily available strategy that is
considered necessary for socio-political reform in post-conflict societies. A mix of international
criminal tribunals, hybrid courts with local and international experts, the ICC, and truth
commissions has enabled transitional justice to advance human rights advocacy and
legislation.109 Scholarship that is critical of transitional justice is plentiful.110 Many of these
critical assessments point to the overly deterministic language that comes from exclusively
analyzing transitional justice through a legal lens. Teitel (2003; 2005) recognizes that transitional
justice is seen as necessary by non-western states emerging from conflict as a means to rebuild
legal, political and social structures. But she also notes that rule of law standards often falls short
of appropriately assessing the role of customary legal practices/other forms of legal pluralism.111
This may in part be due to the way in which transitional justice has been envisioned.
Although a singular definition is difficult to come by, what is agreed upon is a fairly limited view
that transitional justice has on “violence [and its] remedy” with an identifiable victim and
perpetrator.112 Rather than localizing justice in various ways including expanding roles for
customary legal authorities, Western approaches to [transitional] justice emphasize rule of law
standards that cannot be met by post-conflict societies. Critics note this gap in capability has led
non-Western states to conclude that the promotion of rule of law standards is a tool for Western
democracies to destabilize transitional societies and to promote instability in non-Western
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states.113 Contrary to Teitel (2003, 2005), Nagy (2008) insists that while rule of law (as a set of
procedures) is needed for reform in transitional societies, it falls short of addressing issues
relating to “gender, customary law, culture and social justice…”114 Moreover, societies impacted
by authoritarian or communist rule are structurally different from those deemed ‘fragile’ and
‘war-torn.’115 Finally, Nagy (2008) insists that western liberal democracies cannot be the sole
models for social and political change.
Mani (2008) argues that without incorporating an inclusive approach to peace and justice,
post-conflict societies cannot begin to address the structural conditions of violence. Echoed by
Nagy (2008), Mani introduces the idea of ‘reparative justice’ that includes reforms of justicesector institutions (police, judiciary, military), utilizing tribunals, truth commissions and cultural
tools, but also considers the inequalities within communities impacts a society’s capacity to enact
reform.116 The role of culture and local knowledge is a paramount concern for Mani – a
component that features significantly in post-conflict African states. The dominance of the
international legal order cannot be understated and has led to a disconnect between the
technocratic demands of this order in comparison to the customary practices and other forms of
local knowledge in communities impacted by violence. The assumptions underlying demands
made by international actors (including the ICC) to utilize international human rights standards
can lead to an approach to justice that is ‘depoliticised.’117
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By focusing on the socio-political/socio-legal dynamic of post-conflict societies, as
researchers, we can begin to enquire about what it means to transition. How do other processes,
including peace negotiations and Disarmament, Demilitarization, Reintegration (DDR) work in
conjunction with other tools of transitional justice (truth commissions, reparations, prosecutions,
reconciliation)? These processes and strategies cannot be circumscribed by fixed periods of
social change or official transition. Instead, as shown by examples in Rwanda, South Africa and
Liberia, transitional justice becomes an ongoing and dynamic process.
Political will plays an important role in ensuring that peace and reform initiatives are
sustained. Moreover, interventions like transitional justice often occur after violent and
repressive periods in a given state. This makes it very difficult to suggest that peace and
reconciliation can be fulfilled in a particular time period. Rather, as Nagy (2008) emphasizes, the
legacy of structural violence is widespread and can take decades to heal. For instance, “to
construct transition as a break with past violence also neglects the domestic violence that many
women face in a militarised society after male combatants return home.”118 Other scholars have
considered the way in which women experience conflict and post-conflict differently from men
and the resurgence of a violent patriarchy in the post-conflict context.119 Indeed, the socioeconomic environment cannot be distanced from efforts to ensure peaceful transitions to
democracy. Issues like unemployment, housing, and food insecurity are all development
concerns that require leaders to engage with transitional justice in a holistic manner.
These critiques offer a complex understanding of transitional justice that interrogates not
just the need to re-establish rule of law but to address the myriad of concerns that can arise when
we speak of post-conflict reconstruction. Nagy (2008) and others point to the asymmetry that has
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always been embedded in the international legal order. This criticism is often repeated by leaders
in post-conflict African states. Transitional justice essentially becomes a “victor’s justice”
pointing to the manner in which tribunals in Yugoslavia refused to “investigate alleged violations
of international humanitarian law committed by NATO during its bombing campaign in
Kosovo”; as well as the tribunal in Rwanda that “halted investigation of the governing Rwandan
Patriotic Front for war crimes.” 120 The limitations of these transitional justice processes reveals
the dubious ways in which international actors (i.e., the International Criminal Court) are seen as
politicizing transitional justice processes. The suggestion by states political actors, who have
been accused of war crimes, is that these processes may have little to do with local contexts in
war-torn societies.
Framing justice in such narrow terms can limit the scope of the healing and reconciliation
that is needed in the aftermath of violence and conflict (including genocide, massacres, and
sexual violence). Scholars who argue for expanding the reach of transitional justice approaches
also propose a broadening of the scope of recognized violations.121 Nagy (2008) in looking at the
South African TRC notes that while apartheid was widely recognized as a “crime against
humanity”, the victims and perpetrators were narrowly confined to those that “suffered egregious
bodily harm” and presumably those that inflicted it.122
Not unlike other systems of violence, apartheid permeated every facet of social,
economic and political life for non-Whites in South Africa. The debate thereafter is the extent to
which apartheid constituted the “context to crime rather than the crime itself.”123 Systemic
violence in the form of poverty, racism, dispossession – all of which constituted oppressive acts
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–left a legacy that still disproportionately impacts non-White South Africans. The TRC’s role
was too limited to address those impacts, however. Finally, as human rights become more
expansive, including claims to rights to food, housing and employment, the notion of justice
ought to include protection of economic, social and cultural rights (ESC) as well.
Many of these discussions permeate the way in which scholars and practitioners of
transitional justice approach its strategies and tools in post-conflict societies in Africa. The
debates range from how to ensure adequate local expertise is reflected in formal criminal
prosecutions to incorporating traditional mechanisms for justice and reconciliation. In
Somaliland, the transitional justice process, though entirely without international
support/intervention, included many similar issues. The role of the state, community, and
clan/kin networks in framing the legal environment is still being debated. These debates offer
some insight for the need to infuse context-sensitivity into any analysis on transitional justice
processes. While Somaliland offers an interesting case study, drawing parallels between
Somaliland and other African post-conflict societies shows very similar contentions; between
customary and western-legal traditions as well as the need to understand the role of communities
in facilitating not merely justice but peace after violent conflict.
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Chapter Three
This chapter delves into Somaliland’s transitional justice experience and the development
of its legally pluralistic environment. It outlines the way in which Somaliland’s experience with
colonial and post-colonial legal systems has shaped its approach to constitution-building after
violent conflict. More specifically, the need to form the basis of reconciliation, legal norms and
values as well as political organizing on xeer customary laws meant that clan/kin networks
featured heavily in the post-conflict phase. When to invoke sharia in court cases or divert
judgement on the basis of xeer is not always clearly outlined by political and clan elites.
However, sharia is still a part of Somaliland’s legal culture and aids in identifying Somaliland’s
political and cultural values as Islamically derived. This chapter concludes this ambiguity about
the relationship between sharia and xeer has contributed to stagnant legal reform in the areas of
justice and security-sector institutions.
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Background: Somaliland’s experience with transitional justice
Map of Somaliland124

The Somali people are considered to be a largely homogenous ethnic group that reside in
the Horn of Africa and are dispersed throughout many eastern African countries including
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti with the majority living in Somalia and Somaliland. A large
proportion (but not all) of Somali people are characterized by an abiding belief in Islam and its
tenets as well as taking pride in their lineages (abtiiris). The agnastic grouping of Somalis into
clans based on common ancestry is a system that has been borrowed from Islam and Arabia.
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Somalis are divided into six major clans: the Darood, Dir, Issaq, Hawiye, Digil, and
Rahanweyn. All of these clans claim a common Arab ancestry with the family of the Prophet of
Islam Muhammad ibn Abdullah.125 Lewis describes the hierarchical structure of Somali
genealogy by grouping them into 5 distinct categories. The uppermost units are clan-families
that can have from 100,000 members in the case of small groups and up to 1 or 1.5 million
members in larger clan-families.126
Large clans are also further divided into sub-clans which often have a political leader
called a sultan (suldan). The next level below that is the primary lineage group that is marked by
close ties and participation in decision making for the group. The lowest level is known as the
diya-paying group, consisting of groups of family who share a common responsibility in
maintaining order through compensating the families of murdered or injured people in what is
known as diya or blood-wealth. Customary legal proceedings often include this clan group (diyapaying group). This level is the one in which a person’s identity lies and bears the most
responsibility towards. Many Somalis will state their diya-paying group when asked about their
tribal affiliation rather than recounting their abtiiris.127

125

Lewis, 1999, p. 4
Ibid, p. 7
127
Ibid, p. 6
126

51
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The clan-families do not have permanent political ties with one another but unite for a
common goal for specific purposes. Among pastoral communities, clans contribute to their
security and livelihoods by protecting one another from raids on livestock. They often join forces
against other clans to maintain land and water sources for grazing cattle.128 This is important
since the nature of clan relationships throughout the post-colonial independence period (post1960) has become much more politicized and divisive. The unification and separation of Somalia
(in the south) and British Somaliland (modern day Somaliland in the north) led to the difficulty
of bringing different types of state-building processes together (with Italian colonial authorities
in Somalia being far more interventionist and British colonial authorities being more hands-off).
With the transition from colonial to post-colonial statehood largely to blame, unification of the
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Somali territories gave greater demographic numbers to the Southern clans as opposed to the
Northern clans.
During the Barre dictatorship (1969-1991) resources were generally geared towards
Northern clans to discourage any separatist tendencies given their underrepresentation in military
and civilian institutions. Prior to colonialism, law and order were historically maintained through
interpretation of Islamic Law derived from the Shafi’i School of thought and punishment was
usually left up to the enforcement of clan elders. 129 Somali social contracts known as xeer law
were the main form of governance regulating and guiding customs and norms within and
between clans as well as with colonial powers.130 Interpreting xeer law is generally left up to clan
elders. The interpretation of xeer laws and clan relations are generally left to the wadaads (clan
elders) while the enforcement half of clan governance is led by the waranleh (warriors).131 This
structure was predominant throughout the clans of Somalia but as colonial rule spread in the
Horn the role of elders in Somali society would be challenged and ultimately transformed.

Colonial and Post-colonial governance: Statehood, Sovereignty and Clan politics
Historically Somalia has served as a port of trade for both the Far East and the Middle
East and with the main export being livestock. This has long been the main source of revenue for
Somalis living in British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland since the geography of
Somalia/Somaliland does not lend itself to extensive agricultural use, and the majority of
Somalis were pastoral nomads who move with their livestock. Camels are considered to be the
most valuable of the livestock and are favoured especially by clans in Somaliland while goats,
sheep, and a limited amount of cattle are also kept.132
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The British were interested in the port cities of Berbera and Harar as the main sources of
food and supplies for the Yemeni port of Aden where British ships docked on route to India. The
necessity to maintain access to these ports and control transport routes precipitated British
colonial expansion into Somaliland as a protectorate. There was limited economic exchange in
the original treaty, which provided the Somalis with indirect rule.133
This experience with indirect colonial administration formed a basis for Somaliland’s
later political and legal identity as well as serving as the foundation for pursuing independence
[1889-1960] and dissatisfaction with the union with Somalia in 1960. Still, colonial rule was no
less brutal in Somaliland than its southern counterparts. Moreover, there was little to no
economic growth or development occurring in Somaliland in comparison with Somalia (under
direct Italian colonial administration). Although Somalia benefitted from the economic growth of
Italian investment, Italy’s heavy-handed subduing of Somalia by infiltrating its public
administration, systems of governance and culture is still felt today.134
The period after World War II saw Italy’s colonial power severely diminished especially
in East Africa and the removal of the partition of the Somali provinces under British rule. The
Four Power Commission (Britain, France, the United States and Russia) supervised a process
that sought the union of the two Somali territories. The UN led this process towards
independence though and Italy was granted a ten-year trusteeship of the southern Somali state
with the aim to unite Somalia and Somaliland within ten years. To this effect the first legislative
assembly election was held in 1956 with the election of Somalia’s first premier ‘Abdillahi ‘Ise,
the leader of the Somali Youth League (SYL). Similar steps were being taken in Somaliland to
facilitate the democratic process. The union between Somalia and Somaliland is now viewed as
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a part of the legacy of colonial mismanagement with effects for Somalia and Somaliland
apparent till today. Chief among these is the perception of marginalization on the part of
Somaliland which lacked infrastructure and economic investment compared to that in Italian
Somaliland at the time of unification.135
Many of the issues that have contributed to state collapse are directly related to colonial
rule yet post-colonial processes of state and nation-building brought their own challenges and
changes. The 1969 coup led by General Siyad Barre, conducted under the guise of ridding
Somalis of their traditional and primordial attachments to kinship and clan, is the prime example.
Barre’s goals were embodied in the ideology of Scientific Socialism that framed ‘tribal’ (i.e.
clan) affiliations as ‘backward.’ Barre had Pan-Somali pursuits that came into direct
confrontation with issues of sovereignty dictated by the policies of the Organisation of African
Unity (OAU) while clan politics continued to play a vital role in elite politics.
The legacies of Barre’s rule are still felt in Somaliland. In many ways, contemporary
Somaliland is battling against practices that have emerged through colonial practices (indirect
rule), post-colonial statehood (unification), state and nation-building (Scientific Socialism) to
identify its national identity. These legacies certainly made peacebuilding and transitional justice
challenging after a return to clan and kinship ties during the civil war (1989-1991) ensured interclan conflict as a strategy for defense and domination throughout the Horn.
Pan-Somali unity, as a policy sought by Barre’s regime, became increasingly difficult not
only outside of the Somali borders but within the Somali state between 1969-1977. Clan rivalries
threatened Barre’s pursuit of pan-Somali nationhood. Somalilanders certainly felt
disenfranchised by the Barre regime’s practices with cultural and political favouritism and

135

Ahmed & Green, 1999; Samatar, 1992; Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf, 2003

55

double speak. For example, the Barre regime openly praised aspects of Somali tradition like “the
nomadic tradition, but also ignored and degraded other Somali traditions.”136
Barre maintained his position by securing allies with foreign powers and local tribes yet
dissatisfaction and dissent grew in the South and a rebellion had begun by early 1980 in the
North (the Somali National Movement—SNM 1981-1991). In the South the Hawiye-dominated
liberation group known as the United Somali Congress (USC) under General Mohammed Farah
Aideed overthrew the government in 1991, while in the north the SNM made significant gains
against Barre forces. By January 1991, the Somali state was in a state of total collapse that was
marked by the overthrow of Siyad Barre. With the removal of the Barre regime from Somaliland,
independence was declared and followed by a peace process lasting nearly a decade that sought
to restore order and security in the region.

The independence of Somaliland and the peace process
The nature of Somaliland as a state is a precarious one where the international
community touts its peace efforts yet remains indifferent to its pursuit of independence and
formal recognition. Consequently ‘peacebuilding’ in Somaliland has been driven largely through
grassroots efforts. Somaliland often stands out for this approach to constituting peace with little
outside intervention. Contrast this with the peace conferences through the 1990s until 2000,
established and led by the UN, US, AU, IGAD and Ethiopian, Kenyan and Djiboutian
governments playing host to these conferences aimed at securing peace for Southern Somalia.137
In Somaliland, peace was built through ongoing conferences (shiir) in Borame, Berbera
and Burao and the transition from military administration (through the Somali National

136
137

Lata, 2004, p. 156
Kibble and Walls, 2010; Ahmed and Green, 1999; Walls, 2009; Lewis, 2010

56

Movement leadership) to a civilian government in the span of ten years until President Mohamed
Hajji Ibrahim Igal (1999-2002) established the first civilian government through popular
consensus (with clan leaders) rather than electioneering. Somaliland statehood was envisioned by
clan elders as the fusion of traditional and modern systems of governance that saw a role for clan
elders as traditional sources of political authority through the Guurti (Senate) as unelected
members and at the same time to have an elected form of representation through the House of
Representatives.
Somaliland’s achievements in sustaining peace certainly challenges labels of failed
statehood associated with the collapse of Somalia in 1991. Many cases have been made for
exempting Somaliland from that list.138 The notion of ‘hybrid political orders’ is more useful in
describing Somaliland’s peace process. Hybrid political orders do not suggest what the state is
but instead look at what the state/political entity ‘does.’139 Local attempts at peacebuilding in
Somaliland began in 1991 with conferences that were held from February through March and in
May of 1991 in Borame and Burao respectively. These two conferences held not long after
major conflict had ended were marked by their reference to Somali cultural norms through
assemblies (shiir). These early conferences established two key themes: that the union with the
South was undesirable and that revenge should not be exacted on prisoners of war—effectively
setting the stage for future conferences aimed at establishing peace, security and statebuilding.
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In fact, it was the May conference in Burao that proclaimed Somaliland independence.140
Two years later in 1993 the SNM surrendered state power to a civilian administration. Shortly
thereafter the Borama conference brought together the major stakeholders and elders from
various clans and the ulema (religious scholars) to initiate a reconciliation process and discuss
and outline the nature of a Somaliland government. While it was largely an elite-driven process,
it was much more inclusive and bottom-up as it was organized locally and all major clans in the
Northwest were included. In fact, one of the reasons for the establishment of the Guurti (Council
of Elders) was to avoid potential future conflict and have structures in place to deal with them.
Being able to turn to traditional clan structures played a significant role in the success of
Somaliland’s peace and reconciliation processes while disaggregating power to various groups.
However, despite the success of the early peace process in Somaliland there were outbreaks of
armed conflict between clan militias.
The first one erupted in 1991 in the Berbera area, the location of the major seaport in
Somaliland. It started as a dispute between several clans regarding the distribution of the wealth
gained from the port.141 The second outbreak was in 1994-1995 in Hargeisa, involving a conflict
over who would lead the nascent nation. The peaceful resolution of these conflicts was once
again rooted in traditional mechanisms already in place for dealing with conflict and, Prunier
(1998) agrees, those mechanisms account for the institutional strength and popular support of the
Somali National Movement. In 1997, a third national conference was held in Hargeisa
solidifying the institutional structure of the state. As the conference with the widest range of
participants, this was also the one that managed to develop the framework of the state. During
this process the House of Representatives and Senate were established, a supreme court was
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organized and the roles of the presidency and cabinet were elucidated.142 Peace and the
development of the state and nation thus took nearly ten years to get to the point where viable
state institutions were developed.

Transitional Justice in Somaliland
Periodically, Somaliland’s transitional justice, peacebuilding and institutional reform
process can be divided into phases of the SNM insurgency and civil war (1981-1991),
peacebuilding (in 1991 culminating in the Burao conference); security-sector reform (1991-1993
culminating in the Borame conference); Institution-building (1993-1997 culminating in the 1997
Hargeisa conference); Democratisation (1997-ongoing).143 These processes overlapped and
involved multiple stakeholders representing individual clan families coalesced around familiar
xeer practices outlined above but also:
…differed in terms of organisation, scope and attendance, all shared a number of key
characteristics: they were funded largely or wholly by Somaliland communities…in the
diaspora; they involved the voluntary participation of the key figures from each of the
clans affected; and decisions were taken by broad consensus amongst delegates. The
1997 conference in Hargeisa was the last in the series leading to the establishment of an
administrative system that has since proven relatively stable. 144

The collapse of Somalia into civil war was shaped along clan lines and the legacy of
these large and small-scale conflicts is felt today in Somaliland’s declaration of independence
and Puntland’s semi-autonomous governance status. Consequently, peace negotiations in
Somaliland centered on the clans residing in the northern region and major-sub clans (Issaq,
Gadarbursi, Esa, Dhulbante and Warsangeli) of which the Issaq-clan families are the largest and
comprised the majority of Somali National Movement (SNM) participants. After the major

142

Ford et al., 2004
Ali, M. O., Mohammed, K., & Walls, M., 2007, p.15
144
Ibid, p. 16
143

59

conflict with Barre’s forces ended, inter-clan conflict in the North continued with each clan
organizing their own respective militias. With surrenders and truce agreements organized by
various clan families. Clan meetings (shiir) began to emerge and in February 1991 the SNM
(comprised of largely Issaq political leaders) along with the clan elders from the Issaq,
Dhulbathante, Warsangeli, Gadarbursi and Esa held the first meeting in Berbera to reaffirm a
ceasefire.145 At this conference future reconciliation conferences were set up with a timeline to
establish some form of governance structure. The second conference, held on May 18 1991 in
Burao, reaffirmed the declaration of Somaliland’s independence establishing pre-unification
(1960) colonial boundaries. Any administration would inherit a war-torn economy and society as
a consequence of under investment by the Barre regime in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, clan
militias were rampant with demilitarization a significant issue of most reconciliation
conferences. What was to be done with so many weapons?
For this reason, among many others, Somali conflict resolution strategies were often
deployed through large and small-scale reconciliation efforts. Xeer formed much of the basis for
reconciliation conferences. These deliberations were undertaken by a clan elder or ‘aaqil (an
individual who displays sound judgement; a judge) who is also head of the diya-paying group.146
Accordingly, there is no limit per se to the number of aaqil’s that a clan or sub-clan can deploy
but in the clan family hierarchy these judges are subordinate to clan Garaad’s or Suldaan’s.
These elders can form a larger decision-making body within clan families (mainly the diyapaying group) and can represent clans in deliberations or judgements on the basis of xeer. The
value of an elder is held up by the Somali term hadal yaqaan (skilled orator) since until 1976
Somali society relied significantly on its oral cultural tradition to the extent that, the orator is one
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that “…can convince others through rhetoric.” Yet not all elders (odays) are aaqils, rather only a
combination of hadal yaqaan (skilled orator) and xeer yaqaan (knowledgeable in customary
law/practices) qualifies an individual for this title and status.147 Cementing these individual
actors –all elders—is the term guurti (group of elders) that come together to specifically resolve
disputes within and between clans. Somaliland’s peace conferences and reconciliation strategies
(shiirs, xeer, guurti) all formed the basis for its transitional justice experience.

Customary Law (Xeer)
Often understood as the basis upon which customary law operates in Somali society, xeer
is largely unwritten and not uniformly applied. Xeer is an agreed upon set of principles and
practices that are “agreed upon by the clans in each area, and dependent on the deliberations of
elders who gather to resolve specific problems.” It is a living and dynamic set of
principles/practices that evolve over time.148 It encompasses an individuals’ life-cycle from birth
to death including rituals and acceptable moral behaviour and rules. It establishes and fosters
community-building through intra-clan deliberation and inter-clan communication. New xeer
rules emerge as clans seek to resolve disputes with the leadership of the guurti (group of elders)
and if some negotiated settlement is not reached, the xeerbeegti (jury) is brought together upon
which the settlement terms become final and non-negotiable. With the xeerbeegti’s participation
all disputing clan members understand the jury members to act as neutral parties with the venue
also acting as a neutral space. 149
Somali clans (more specifically the diya-paying groups) are built upon a system of
patrilineal descent with clan intermarriages serving as a basis to strengthen clan ties and “xeer
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agreements.” With these social functions severely disrupted as a consequence of conflict, the
Somali National Movement’s reconciliation conferences involved ‘bride exchanges’ (led by clan
leaders) but also resource allocation and DDR (demobilization, disarmament and reintegration)
of clan militias. Satisfying the tenets of xeer meant that reconciliation venues were neutral to
participating clans and guurti members were drawn from these clans. The reconciliation
conferences may be understood as a “clan-based discursive democracy” that focused on ending
conflict and establishing structures of governance. With men largely in attendance and acting as
decision-makers, the role that Somaliland women had was limited to supporting these
conferences through meal preparation, cleaning and decorating the venue. Few women spoke
during these conferences because ‘clan’ was the foundation and basis for who could participate
during the peace conferences. This is significant because these conferences shaped reconciliation
and dialogue and the patriarchal basis excluding Somaliland women from post-conflict
rebuilding and reform. Since then, women’s rights movements have been challenging xeer
practices that they saw as detrimental to their civil and political rights from the onset of the
reconciliation conferences.
Xeer was the most significant socio-legal practice that shaped the reconciliation
conferences that lasted from 1991 – 1997 and encompassed a number of major clan dominated
towns and cities.150 These locations were the sites of significant clashes with Siad Barre forces,
prior to the collapse of the Somali state, effectively decimating homes and institutions in the
North. The civil war centered on clan conflicts and dynamics fueled by decades of mistrust and
suppression of Northern clan families by the dictatorship. Consequently, xeer is an appropriate
foundation to base reconciliation efforts upon since it predates modern state institutions and

150

Hargeisa, Borame, Burao, Berbera and Sanaag

62

practices. Significant achievements attributed to xeer include restoring social relations between
warring clans; and demobilisation of clan militias making way for an organized armed force
under the auspices of a centralized government. Following the formal peace negotiations during
the reconciliation conferences, a period of institutional and physical rebuilding was initiated with
the establishment of the first SNM civilian administration (1991-1993) included the development
of security and governance infrastructure. Democratization was an ongoing process throughout
the 1990s, leading to the referendum on Somaliland’s constitution (2000).

Xeer and Legal Reform
This period of reconciliation and transition nonetheless was marked with difficulties of
weak public infrastructures and revenue generation for the state being an important
preoccupation. It depended on a mixture of remittances and generating tax revenues. A problem
related to government expenditure was also a hugely inflated army, reportedly taking up to 70%
of the budget.151 Somaliland’s constitution was ratified in 2000 with a reaffirming vote of
confidence for independence despite that fact that the vote was quite close. This illustrates that
perhaps larger questions regarding Somaliland’s national identity are not quite as agreed upon as
many popular discourses may suggest. Moreover, beginning in 2001 there were small-scale
conflicts between Somaliland and its neighbour Puntland over boundaries and authority over the
regions Sool and Sanaag that were claimed by both Puntland and Somaliland.152
The emergence of Somaliland’s nationalism and peace and statebuilding process is
underpinned by discourses about how little it has in common with its neighbours to the South. In
particular, the localized efforts at reconciliation and the tools that were used (i.e. shiir, bride-
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swapping, elders) are framed as enduring practices for building cohesion in a divided society. In
that sense, it is worth considering whether colonial rule interfered so little with Somali culture
due to the benevolence of colonial authorities or owing to the strength of Somaliland clans and
their elders’ capacity to negotiate colonial agreements benefiting themselves?
Among the challenges in sustaining functioning legal systems was the way in which legal
reform was envisioned during the transitional justice period. Developing parallel but competing
legal systems (religious, customary and secular) involves a combination of written and unwritten
doctrines and norms. Customary law (xeer) was more closely developed and aligned with shariah
legal values (closely following the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence). Often applied informally and
unevenly across clan families (diya-paying group), xeer and shariah allowed for a degree of
autonomy among clan families while also strengthening the notion of a legal community through
a common set of practices that included marriage, divorce and inheritance rights. For example,
shariah allows women to maintain property rights and strictly regulates inheritance rights. In this
way shariah may be seen as more flexible than xeer, including who could interpret Shariah (i.e.,
religious leaders who were also clan elders but not always).153 Xeer customarily subsumes any
property owned by women into her husband’s clan. It was often customary legal rulings that
offered the best opportunity for clan elders to exert their authority and reinforce male dominance
in family life. Shariah is more strictly interpreted by sheikhs and individuals with a stronger
background in Islamic jurisprudence, while xeer judges—as individuals with observable good
character—with knowledge of customary legal traditions acquired through successive rulings,
could conceivably be any member of the clan family who has attained the status of an ‘elder.’
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This may be one of the many reasons why xeer is more efficiently utilized than shariah in
disputes. British colonialism deployed a “codified law and a judicial system based on British
Common and Statute Law and the Indian Penal Code.”154 Moreover, looking at what was an
informal gathering between elders and relevant members during dispute resolution meetings in
communities, the British sought to formalize this process through establishing “Akil’s [aaqils]
courts and…Qaadi’s courts to apply customary law, while Shariah law continued to be applied in
domestic matters.”155 The relationship between shariah and xeer was deepened prior to British
colonial rule through the administration of Egyptian colonial officers (1875-85) that further
arabized Somali lineage bonds through “…a system of indirect rule through lineage headmen
(‘aaqils).” This system merely served as a formalizing of authoritative rule by clan elders to act
as mediators between colonial authorities and clan families.156 British officers further
institutionalized these authorities through the Local Authorities Ordinance of 1950 and with 360
diya-paying groups in 1958, according to I.M. Lewis (1959), organizing some system for
dispensing the legal authority of British colonial officers meant that aaqils were merely
figurehead authorities employed to act as go-betweens for colonial administrators.157 This
practice essentially diminished the value of xeer as an effective dispute resolution mechanism
because it was subject to the authority of British administrative laws.
British Somaliland (in the North) and Italian Somaliland (in the South) united to
constitute Somalia (1960) with no less than four legal traditions in operation (British, Italian,
xeer and shariah). There was an attempt to assimilate these laws in the legislature in (1962)
where the “…civil, penal and commercial laws [were] based on Italian law, whereas the criminal
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procedure code was to be based on Anglo-Indian law.”158 Shariah and customary law (certified
and endorsed by civil courts) dealt with family and civil issues as well as land, water, diyapayments and grazing rights, respectively. This legal pluralism was in place from 1962 – 1977 in
Somaliland where British common law was still practiced in part because the judges were more
familiar with it, than the Italian legal code. Not until 1973 did the Barre military regime
introduce some form of a unified civil code dealing mainly with “inheritance, personal contracts
and water grazing rights which sharply curtailed both the Shariah and Somali customary law.” 159
Changes to Shariah and customary legal practices were targeted for destruction by the
dictatorship whereby the death penalty was applied to homicide offenses and compensation was
restricted to a “close relative.” Diya-payments were in many cases divvyed up by extended clan
members and curtailing this meant further devaluing the role of customary law as an important
dispute-resolution tool. Moreover, Shariah law was targeted through the enactment of the 1975
Family Law effectively granting equal status to women to inherit land and wealth. 160 This latter
change resulted in a violent confrontation with religious scholars that saw ten executed in one
day by the military regime. The actions of the Barre regime effectively pitted women’s rights
against Shariah law, a narrative that impacts perceptions of Somaliland women’s rights activism
till now.
Throughout Barre’s dictatorship, the courts were also severely diminished in terms of
capacity and resources with the Supreme and constitutional courts dismantled and the authority
of the lower courts (district and appeals) were reduced to make way for the creation of the
National Security Courts (NSCs). These courts operated in secrecy and targeted those the
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government considered subversives and threatened national security interests with courts in the
capital (Mogadishu) and other major cities. 161 The repressive tactics deployed the Barre
dictatorship, particularly in the aftermath of the Somali civil war precipitated a desire among
Somaliland peacemakers to re-establish traditional and customary legal authorities. However,
among the challenges in establishing an effective judiciary and legal system(s) was that those
known jurists returning from the IDP camps and the diaspora were largely fluent in the Italian
legal code of Southern Somalia. It was not until the Borame conference in 1993 that a charter
outlining an independent judiciary and the need for a civilian police force and reverting to pre1969 legal traditions was established. This charter was effectively ratified and framed the
Somaliland constitution which was later affirmed in a public referendum in 2001
In practice though, the primacy of customary law (xeer) was consistently reinforced since
many judges and legal institutions were still in their infancy in the early 2000s. Not only is
Shariah difficult to interpret in a meaningful way (with knowledgeable jurists) popular sentiment
has suggested that the Somaliland populace is wary of its potential abuse; as such Shariah is
rarely utilized.162 Xeer is even more inconsistent but prevails owing in part to the presence of
customary judges and the weak enforcement of civil courts. In one report that conducted
interviews with workshop participants, some participants felt that the common law system ought
to “…apply to civil and criminal matters, the shariah to family matters and customary law to clan
matters.”163 To emphasize the incoherency of these systems operating on an instance of
homicide, Article 418 of the criminal code results in the death penalty for a convicted felon,
Shariah recommends the death penalty or compensation for the relatives of the victim. Finally,
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xeer (as established between the two parties through precedence and general practice observed
by each clan family) treats the matter as a collective responsibility and like Shariah offers the
same two options with many victims relatives opting for compensation. 164 These comments
suggest that ordinary Somalilanders recognize the inconsistent and often contradictory role that
common law, xeer and Shariah law can play in arriving at judgements.
Judicial Reform
As Somaliland’s political and legal system arose out of the Borame Conference (January
– May 1993) where priorities included establishing a viable system of governance and the
development of a National Charter. This charter maintained the “independence of the Judiciary
and the impartiality of judgement; the right to justice and equality under the law.”165 The Borame
conference also asserted the powers of the Guurti (elders) as the Upper House in a bicameral
legislative assembly. The Guurti in its nascent form after the Borame conference ensured the
cessation of minor conflicts in 1995 and 1997 to emerge as an authoritative collective of local
leaders. The institutionalization of the Guurti did not take place till the ratification of the
constitution in 2000 and till today this Upper House maintains a bridge to traditional legal
authority (xeer) in Somaliland.
Somaliland’s judicial system is comprised of three levels including the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeal and Regional/District Courts (serving six regions and innumerable districts).
These courts operate with varied levels of capacity and effectiveness with less populated
regions/districts having fewer courts to deal with legal matters.166 This framework is largely
derived from the 1962 (post-independence) constitution and ratified in 1993 (post-Somaliland
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independence). Elements from the 1962 Criminal Code that remained included sentencing and
compensation, the role of each court (district, regional and supreme) and the download of civil
cases to District courts only. The role that sharia law has is more ambiguous and where
sharia/customary law (which are not equally applied) is used it is only ever applied to “personal
statute matters i.e., family disputes, inheritance, child custody.”167 There is no formal sharia
court in Somaliland and many of these personal statute cases are heard in district courts with the
presiding judge deciding on their outcome. Issues surrounding the competency of judges often
arises particularly in cases where penalties and sentencing are deemed too harsh and indeed it
has been noted that with each ascending level, the qualifications of judges goes up.168 Appeal
courts (commonly referred to as regional courts) and the Supreme court are not mandated to
engage with issues relating to customary/sharia law although there is no legal provision
excluding them from hearing or ruling on these cases. The role of district and regional courts that
often become the first point of contact in civil, criminal and customary law or sharia cases is the
most relevant for Somalilanders engagement with a legal pluralism as an everyday experience.
This transitional justice experience (focusing on local conferences and that was
reconciliatory in nature) emphasized the role of traditional authorities and practices derived from
xeer and sharia (although only the latter is enshrined in the Somaliland constitution).169 The
degree to which customary laws or sharia laws are utilized is not predictable. Choices are often
made on a case by case basis by clan elders. Considering the prominence that xeer has had in the
transitional justice process of Somaliland, the interchangeable usage of shariah/customary laws
at the district courts demonstrates the default status of xeer over sharia. Sharia is enshrined in the
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Somaliland constitution in so far as if there are laws that contradict it, the former will supersede
any judgement that is derived from an alternative source. However, it is recognized more as a
symbolic statement than enforced unlike shariah-strict legal systems that exist in Saudi Arabia.
The aftermath of conflict also illustrates the importance of rebuilding vital institutions
including the judiciary. District/regional courts are not all operational in every district in
Somaliland nor are there sufficient judges to hear cases that may arise in more peripheral regions
in Somaliland.170 This is not uncommon particularly when considering that during the
transitional justice period at the Hargeisa conference (1997), the Awdal region was provided
with ample judges between the district and appeals courts (six in total) and yet deference was
given to local elders in mediating and arbitrating disputes. These were then sent to the district
courts as written accounts of proceedings. This practice is still happening today with elders and
customary laws, largely taking the role of judges and courts in major civil and criminal disputes
and the courts are relegated to dealing with minor level civil and criminal disputes.171 This
includes homicide cases which are also settled outside of courts and accordingly “…if the family
of the victim agree on the blood compensation (diya), the homicide is free.”172 That is to say, the
perpetrator faces no jail time.
The competing legal frameworks of customary, shariah and British common law in
Somaliland, often mean that the “Islamization” of Somaliland is constantly under review and
negotiated through courts, elders and the use of xeer.173 The significance of this is one of degrees
of punishment whereby xeer allots compensation for homicide cases, and sharia by all accounts
mandates capital punishment in instances of homicide. In the early peacebuilding period (1991-
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1997), xeer proved more effective as a dispute resolution mechanism since it privileged clan and
kin ties whereas sharia has certainly gained resonance in contemporary Somaliland directly
challenging the role of xeer and by extension clan ties.
Reforming the judiciary to strengthen the institutional capacity of courts and judges is
contentious indicating that Somaliland’s nascent judiciary is still in transition. As well, the
tenuous balance between Shariah, customary and common law is an example of everyday justice
– reflective of community practices and evolving social norms. Institutionalizing the judiciary to
establish rule of law during the early peace process was important for Somaliland peacebuilders.
Initially between 1997-2000, this was prioritized to enable democratic institutions to flourish in
the interests of independence and formal recognition of Somaliland as a viable state separate
from Somalia. Certainly, challenges persisted particularly in the case of how a legally pluralistic
environment operates in practice. As noted, the capacity of the judiciary was severely limited as
a consequence of the civil war and post-war preference for customary law (xeer) to resolve
disputes throughout the peace process. Bendana and Chopra (2013) highlight that during the
institutionalizing of Somaliland’s judiciary, certain standards could not be maintained. These
standards include the “principle of equality, due process, transparency, the right of appeal,
individual liability, and the presumption of innocence.”174 These are fundamental rights in the
context of international law, yet, in many instances, demonstrates the gap between formal
institutions and “less state-centric justice norms” including customary practices.175 In order to
advance notions of everyday justice as a part of legitimate process of delivering justice and
security, the experiences of community practices peripheral to the state need to be explored
further.
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Clan and kin networks are most effective at the local level to the extent that justice and
security-sector reform were not taken seriously till the 2010 election of the Kulmiye government
in Somaliland. With varying degrees of success, Somaliland’s experience with transitional
justice mechanisms (including xeer) has ensured that “clans and power individuals continue to
dominate the provision of justice and security…without hesitating to use formal legal institutions
to enhance their power.”176 This tacit use of institutions to reinforce traditional authorities is
difficult to outline since many of these discussions between political elites and clan elders are
done in secrecy. Indeed given the overlap of Shariah and customary legal practices there is a
degree of arbitrariness to the way in which judges or traditional authorities provide rulings on
cases. The concern, with the lack of transparency, arises when we see that customary legal
practices are fluidly adopted to benefit local clan elites to the extent that clans “shape [the]
performance” of Somaliland’s legal system. Judges are chosen for their clan affiliation rather
than their level of expertise.177 Shariah cases are largely evidenced through family law matters
including marriage, divorce and inheritance although customary practices are imposed from time
to time. Moreover, while laws exist to ensure that the foundations for democratic governance and
rule of law are maintained, “their application is continuously negotiated.”178 How does this
impact the way that everyday justice operates in Somaliland? How might this threaten or
maintains its fragile peace? Looking more specifically as Somaliland’s security-sector and
justice-sector reform process, we can discern the ways in which everyday justice, involving clan
elders, political elites and ordinary citizens, impact on Somaliland’s legal pluralism.
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Security-Sector (Police and Military) Reform
Somaliland’s attempts to reform the Police and Military during and after the transitional
justice period (1991-2000) were largely ignored by clan elites, unlike judicial reform attempts.
This was due in part to the rise of intra-clan conflict in the mid-1990s that relied heavily on
reconciliatory justice practices founded on xeer. As such, police and military laws were still
based on the 1970s doctrines derived from the Siad Barre dictatorship era. Re-established in
1993 the Somaliland police force is loosely governed by regulations that equip it with broad but
limited enforcement powers.179 Considering the state of institutions in post-war Somaliland,
policing was largely absent in the traditional sense and the force itself can be said to have acted
more as ‘peacekeepers’ than enforcers of the law. However, as Somaliland’s political and
judicial institutions have grown in sophistication, police and military legal reform remains
stagnant. Article 130(5) refers to the “test of conformity” that outlines any legal reforms or
doctrines must be in conformity with Shariah laws and respect human rights.180 Although in
many instances, international human rights standards may be in contradiction to Shariah laws.
Instituting security-sector laws that derive from pre-1969 (pre-dictatorship) laws requires
considerable scrutiny, particularly considering the adoption of colonial laws that characterized
newly formed institutions in a unified Somalia at the time. It is worth considering in this context,
what reform means in the Somaliland peacebuilding context and how police and military legal
reforms aid in supporting locally driven peace initiatives.
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Security-sector reform occurred with three significant attempts (2011, 2012, 2017) with
the introduction of the Somaliland police law; first introduced during the transitional justice
period in 1995. The 1995 law 181 set the foundation for the structure, appointments and
recruitment. The 2011and 2012 reforms attempts involved establishing greater accountability for
police officers when they abuse their powers. Police accountability is mediated through military
courts and civilian oversight is entirely absent. The Somaliland Human Rights Center has long
advocated for an independent, civilian body to investigate claims made against police officers.
The 2017 reform bill that was formally adopted in July 2019 still does not address or take up the
issue of accountability. The 2017 reform bill was put forth in the House of Representatives and it
sought to separate the police force from being seen as an extension of the military force through
a series of constitutional amendments to Article 5 of the Somaliland constitution.
This relationship between the military and police force stems from the legacy of the civil
war. Somaliland’s relatively disorganized militias came together under the banner of the Somali
National Movement (SNM) to revolt against Siad Barre’s military forces. The difference in
capability and organization was clear from the onset. As such, Somaliland’s independence and
the development of nascent laws relating to the security-sector recognized the need to ensure that
a viable military force existed to push back against aggression by any future government in
Somalia. Secondly, the clan militias emerging from the civil war required effective DDR
(demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration) into an organized police and military
force.182
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The establishment of the military and police forces occurred simultaneously in 1995 and
given the small-scale conflicts among Somaliland clans, the police were given “provisional
military status.”183 This was carried over into the 2017 reform bill and critical appraisal of the
bill indicates that among the key issues was accountability for police officers. Whereas a military
court is established to deal with abuses of power or offenses committed by military officers, the
police reform bill (2017) extends that same protection from civilian courts to police officers. For
human rights advocates this approach can prove quite contrary to democratic principles and
ideals.
This history is hugely relevant to the way in which Somaliland’s police force operates in
contemporary times. The Somaliland police force has its origins in the colonial period when
Somaliland was a British protectorate (then known as the Somaliland Police Ordinance No.2,
1927). These officers were entirely in service to British colonial officers and included a formal
police force along with a “rural constabulary (known as Illalo – look out or guard)” in 1959 that
supported policing efforts in pastoral and remote communities in British Somaliland at the time.
These two factions merged into the modern police force in 1970.184 Under various iterations of
statehood from post-colonial independence to post-war statebuilding, the Somaliland police force
was last known as a civilian force in 1958 (Police Ordinance No. 2 of 20 February 1958) and can
only be subsumed under the military force in times of war. This has significant implications for
legal reform in the security-sector and points to the legacy of the transitional justice process
during the early peace conference.
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The transitional justice conferences underscored the pre-1969 laws and statutes from the
British colonial era to post-colonial statehood (1960 – 1969). This approach in many ways
stalled security-sector reform attempts under the guise of securing peace between clan and kin
networks. Indeed, the 1993 National Charter, upon which much of Somaliland’s current legal
framework is based, has enabled institution-building and enforced peace and security along with
xeer. Legal reform is taken up by the House of Representatives as well as the House of Elders
(Guurti) and this has proven challenging for many given the tenuous relationship between clan,
community and the state making it difficult for reforms to be passed. Coupled with a complicated
merger during the union with Somalia (1960 – 1991), the Somaliland military and police force
has been under the command of military officers since post-colonial independence. Many of
those in attendance at the Somaliland peace conferences were police or military officers familiar
with the pre-1969 and 1972 police and military laws. As such, the incentive to carry forward
laws recognizable to many who foresaw similar roles for themselves in a post-conflict
Somaliland was certainly attractive and has been maintained as the status quo.
The extent of social and political marginalization for citizens that are not represented in
meaningful ways through clan/kin networks is acute in the face of stalled legal reforms. Legal
reforms in the security-sector have stalled significantly and certainly impact on the capacity of
ordinary citizens to seek justice. It may also be the case that Somaliland’s relative stability has
given way to new forms of ‘everyday’ that seek to privilege a post-war status quo in the face of
weak institutions.
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The everyday and Judicial and Security-Sector Reform
Somaliland’s justice-sector reform evidenced through its transitional justice experience in
the early peace process has left a legacy of incoherent legal norms and practices. Yet the delivery
of justice and security, as complex as it is, still plays a functional role in stabilizing its nascent
post-war institutions. It is through the experience of ‘everyday justice’ that ordinary
Somalilanders enact agency, reinforce community and enact xeer on a daily basis to maintain its
relevance. Indeed, considering its absence from the constitution, outlining its limitations and
applications, xeer is left to social groups (clan and kin networks) to enforce. Its reach also
spreads to the police force wherein the “police like the judiciary are no guarantor of impartiality,
as they too reflect and respond to various clan interests.”185 This can take the form of releasing
offenders into the hands of clan elders/families rather than jailing them – another enduring
practice from the early peace process where perpetrators often sought asylum with clan families.
In light of this, negotiated settlements has become such a norm that judges and police at the
district level have come to expect them. Practices like this speak more readily to the way in
which communities have come to rely upon a decentralized delivery of justice (where the district
courts rarely enforce rulings outside of clan elders involvement) that community and clan
supersede other governing institutions. This disjuncture between de jure governance and de facto
governance may seem haphazard and lacking in accountability. In many ways, particularly for
women and other vulnerable groups subjugated by patriarchal clan dynamics, the state is
severely lacking in accountability and rights-based governance. Yet, it is also in this same system
that Somalilanders have relied upon to ensure their fragile peace is maintained and act as a
deterrence against retributive justice at the community-level (i.e., inter-clan conflict).
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In a clan-based society like Somaliland the role of elders as adjudicators, mediators and
enforcers of law and order seems necessary in the context of customary processes being seen as
responsible for ending large and small-scale conflicts. The benefits of privileging customary
laws has enabled Somaliland to promote reconciliatory forms of justice and healing but issues of
equity, and accountability persist. While xeer is largely unregulated and left to clan families to
utilize and dispense with, the Guurti (house of elders) is the de facto legislative body responsible
for institutionalizing aspects of xeer that have become commonplace. However, these elders are
an unelected body of legislators that serve lifetime appointments. Consequently, there is growing
discontent with the Guurti with many in Somaliland viewing it as a “conservative body” that can
curtail progressive “social and legislative change.”186 The decentralized nature of governance
and the presence of different legal systems operating simultaneously ensures that the community
remains the basis of legal authority and power for many Somalilanders. Moreover, “notions of
justice and security [that] are based on communal, rather than individual responsibility” are
powerful vestiges of Somali cultural norms and values.187 The distinction between the state legal
system and customary laws “…is that the state law system is virtually never used for a civil
claim. Thus, the state legal system comes to be identified almost completely with criminal
justice.”188 How might justice and security-sector reform be approached in Somaliland in the
face of entrenched local customs and norms? Does reform involve dispensing with legal
pluralism and promoting the state legal system?
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The fact that customary legal traditions are rooted in community and clan networks
makes it difficult to wrest these traditions away from local elites. The complicity of state
authorities should also be noted in the way they rely on clan politics to ensure political
representation while simultaneously seeking to limit the powers of traditional authorities. The
patriarchal nature of clan and kin networks is among the main issues of concern for legal
reformists in Somaliland. Political leaders and parties in Somaliland operate on a power-sharing
model that seeks equal representation in the Upper (Guurti) and Lower House of representatives
in terms of clan. As, Somaliland’s constitution ensures that should the President be from the
Issaq clan, then the Vice-President must be from the Gadarbursi clan. Women and minority clans
are absent from this power-sharing framework. In this regard, Bendana and Chopra (2013) are
apt in suggesting that the “state itself is incapable of or is uninterested in subtracting itself from
clan politics as its own composition reflects clan balances.”189
Where the needs of local elites are maintained and reinforced, directly correlates to lack
of state capacity to effectively govern; what Ken Menkhaus (2008) terms as the “mediated state”
– “when state authorities develop an interest in asserting or reasserting security and rule of law in
their hinterland, but lack the capacity.190” Negotiations and compromises between state
authorities and local elites are rampant and curtails judicial reform in favour of stability. The
impact of this is effectively stalled democratic governance in terms of legal reform and
weakened state accountability where institutions are less and less relied upon to deliver basic
services including the justice and security-sector. For example, victims of crimes are often
redirected from taking punitive measures in common law courts to customary proceedings where
a negotiated settlement is privileged.
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Still, the goal of justice and security-sector reform in Somaliland cannot be to entirely do
away with xeer, particularly as it serves a key function in promoting reconciliatory justice.
Somaliland’s justice and security-sector exists in a framework that allows for legal pluralism to
exist in balance between state and traditional authorities. While marginalized communities and
groups cannot claim power in this context, examining this sector through the lens of everyday
justice can offer insight to the ways these groups circumvent blocks to access to justice and
corrupt security forces. This arrangement between state and non-state security and justice sector
providers has been termed “multi-layered” and held together by a “mutual recognition of capital
(economic, symbolic, cultural and social).”191 With the army and police forces as its “key
resources” these security and justice providers maintain control and their work can often dismiss
human rights approaches to justice and security.192 Yet, without totalizing the experiences of
Somalilanders’ notions of justice and security as compromised and deficient, Moe and Simojoki
(2013) suggest that there is progress being made. The struggles of “everyday…peacebuilding”
must also include approaches to legal reform. Everyday peacebuilding also includes justice and
security-sector reform.193 Contrast this with the international human rights approach that sets
universal values and norms as standards for effective rule of law. Moe and Simojoki (2013)
caution against framing the delivery of justice and security in conflict-affected states by
international human rights standards. Rather, as the gradual institutionalization of these services
has grown and become more sophisticated in Somaliland, so too has the expectation of the state
by its citizens.194 This includes appointing competent and impartial judges given the practice that
many judges are appointed by clan elders to occupy common law courts (i.e., for district courts)
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to their benefit. Instead, appointing knowledgeable and impartial judges, would allow for greater
trust between local communities and state authorities. This institutionalization does not displace
the prominence and reliance on customary laws and practices to safeguard and deliver on justice
and security. This hybridization of laws and norms has proven effective for ordinary
Somalilanders. Moreover, the adaptability of traditional authorities to the increasing role of the
state has been documented indicating that customary practices are dynamic and capable of
evolving with social norms and emerging legal practices (including incorporating greater
protection under international human rights laws for vulnerable groups).
A Danish Refugee Council (DRC) project was initiated in 2003 to address the gap
between the approach of traditional authorities to rule of law and protections for human rights.
This was the first initiative to address justice and security-sector reform outside of the
transitional justice process in the early 1990s. The project was generated after an increase in
revenge killings in Somaliland among sub-clan groups led to clan elders relying on traditional
approaches (i.e., mediation between warring clan groups) to end these killings. The DRC was
initially reluctant to support xeer-based approaches considering the lack of inclusivity of local
actors that are already marginalized by customary laws. Despite the controversial approach, the
DRC acquiesced to support traditional elders in their mediation efforts arguing the importance of
locally rooted justice and security-sector actors. Their belief was that the legitimacy derived from
these elders offers a greater opportunity to develop access to justice and improved security
programs for rural and otherwise peripheral communities.195 Secondly, the DRC posited that
their participation allowed for them to advocate for better cooperation between traditional
authorities and state security providers. While idealistic, the proposition put forth by the DRC
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served to enhance the authority of traditional elders while simultaneously seeking to promote
human rights. With varied levels of success, DRC officials during workshops and sessions
highlighted those areas where xeer conflicted with human rights standards and elders agreed to
amend those areas. This agreement, drawn up with the support of the DRC, became known as the
Elders Declaration at a conference in Hargeisa in 2006. This declaration included commitments
by customary authorities to turn over “offenders of serious crime” to the state rather than clan,
and expanding protections (physical and financial security) to vulnerable groups including
widows who were often dispossessed after their husbands death by his clan family.196 While this
declaration was significant at the time, its implementation and adherence to date has had mixed
results with the Guurti largely ignoring it in practice but openly restating its value. Moe and
Simojoki (2013) attributed this to the disconnect in principles between international law and
customary approaches to law particularly where the latter privileges oral agreements and the
former written agreements.197
When assessing the overall adherence and success of the Elders Declaration on
Somaliland society, everyday instances of justice and security delivery are best seen through
court administration. In general, respondents in a post-Declaration assessment indicated that
levels of revenge killings had decreased and a greater number of offenders of major crimes
(including murder) are referred to state courts. Moreover, shariah law has been increasingly
preferred by women’s rights organisations since shariah provides a more equitable distribution of
inheritance and marital property (for example) than xeer. Women’s rights organisations have
sought to assert their rights through shariah giving an indication of the progressive role that
shariah has for Somaliland women when compared to the use of xeer. The Elders Declaration
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reinforced the authority of traditional elders effectively maintaining the status quo and male
privilege. As well, other marginalized groups that have limited access or lacked status and
representation from clan families (including women and members of minority clans) remained
unable to access justice and adequate physical security to protect their legal interests.198
The importance of legal pluralism to facilitating diverse pathways for justice and security
delivery is touted as a success in the DRC case study but important challenges persisted as well.
If deeply entrenched social attitudes towards inequalities are left unaddressed, legal pluralism
will end up reinforcing those very inequalities. The DRC initiative was later expanded to include
transformative social change at the community-level by empowering local actors (particularly
those marginalized by all legal systems) to participate in the DRC’s justice and security-sector
reform programs. Operating at the micro-level (families, households, individuals) to challenge
systemic barriers to reform, the DRC integrated its work with other peacebuilding initiatives.
The DRC eventually recognized that without framing the experience of justice and securitysector reform in the context of the pursuit of ‘peace’ and an end to major and minor conflict,
local support would be difficult to come by.
Global NGOs like the DRC are part and parcel in the process to reform justice and
security-sector practices in post-conflict societies. In the DRC project, similar to the UNDP’s
justice-sector reform initiatives, the global and local interact in ways that impact significantly on
local norms and practices. In the context of weak state capacity and infrastructure, international
agencies/organisations will continue to play an important role in pushing for reform. Hybrid
forms of governance involve international actors as a part of the transitional justice process. But
it is important for communities that these programs are directed at are also contesting their
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presence and can assert local agency surrounding legal reform. Ultimately, any reform initiative
may have a lasting impact on local communities and for it to be sustainable it must also be highly
participatory. Contrary to conventional approaches to justice and security-sector reform,
contestation is not necessarily an adversarial experience for local actors participating in reform
projects initiated by international organizations. What is crucial is maintaining the positive
practices related to peacebuilding and conflict resolution while recognizing the importance of
dismantling social inequalities.199 The role of international actors as facilitators and mediators
ought to include collaborating with communities to address social inequality. Consequently,
post-conflict societies with experience in legal pluralism can help to facilitate access to power for
marginalized groups (i.e., women’s rights activists seeking to use shariah over xeer). The
presence of international organizations or actors does not entirely do away with the power
structures that uphold these legal systems. For instance, men are still seen as authoritative jurists
in shariah and xeer adjudication processes. Nevertheless, legal pluralism as manifested in the
everyday experience of law for ordinary Somalilanders does not suggest, from the DRC
experience, that social norms are inflexible. Instead, Somalilanders have taken up various reform
initiatives (whether initiated from international actors or locally driven) and found ways to
ensure that contestation does not lead to conflict. In 2012, I witnessed numerous attempts by
women’s rights organisations to collectively organize to initiate legal reform. This includes adhoc meetings I attended with women in Hargeisa, from the same sub-clan, who came together to
demand appropriate compensation in terms of property allocation by their clan elders. This was
an issue of concern since many women who end up divorced or widowed forfeit all the property
that was in their husband’s name; directly impacting their livelihood. These women sought to
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challenge this practice in common law courts as well as in xeer proceedings. In this way,
everyday justice for Somaliland women who are negatively impacted by xeer can include
forming new social relationships that are not dictated by xeer (i.e., a women’s association based
on clan affiliation).
As Moe and Simojoki (2013) point out, the emphasis on “relationships rather than
distinctively on law” has been central to the DRC’s relative success with reform. Everyday
justice encapsulates this process by highlighting that “…the empirical reality of justice and
security being processes deeply steeped in sociopolitical dynamics, societal norms and power
relations” can be a peripheral experience for Somalilanders who understand xeer, civil/common
law and Shariah law as a matter of experience “…rather than isolated and strictly legal
domains.”200 Indeed, the ‘everyday’ on the one hand is an accumulation of daily experiences in
highly social and relational contexts and on the other hand, it is at this level that social
transformation and agency are the most impactful. The everyday can destabilize universalist
approaches to justice and security-sector reform in favour of more tailored and nuanced
practices. In this way, Somaliland’s legal pluralism is adaptive and fluid. This illustrates my
larger point that transitional justice in practice can seem far removed from local understandings
of the ‘law.’201 The perception can arise when local processes become institutionalized (such as
the Guurti). Somaliland elders (who are not members of the Guurti) who hold interpretive power
with respect to customary laws may be more generally allied with the legislative body concerned
with decision-making largely comprised of elders. This process can distance the individual clan
members or those unaffiliated with a clan from a culturally specific and accessible form of
justice. Hybrid political processes can be instrumental here to aid in alleviating significant forms
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of marginalization. It also means that Somaliland as a state needs to strengthen its common law
doctrines to enable ordinary citizens access to the formal courts. However, as is shown below,
Somaliland’s attempts at legal reform are juxtaposed against the need to maintain peace and
order at the expense of potentially contentious social and political dialogue.

Chapter Four
This chapter outlines how we understand ‘the everyday’ in relation to legal reform in
general and the aims of transitional justice (i.e., sustainable peace) more specifically. This is
done to offer an alternative perspective to legal reforms that are not seen as legitimate in the eyes
of Western legal institutions. This chapter outlines the connections between local experiences of
justice in post-conflict contexts and international legal approaches to achieving justice. In postconflict African states’ experience with transitional justice has given rise to localized
understandings of justice that privilege reconciliatory approaches. This is juxtaposed with
international humanitarian laws that are often imposed top-down. A critical turn towards justice
and security-sector reform stemming from the bottom-up (communities) has enabled the
emergence of ‘the everyday’ as an analytical lens. The Somaliland case has shown that given the
presence of three distinct legal systems, communities have privileged local knowledge and
customary approaches; although there are many that challenge this deference to xeer. As well,
legal reform in Somaliland has not advanced in a significant way since the end of formal
transitional justice process during the early peace conferences. The state has not diminished in
legitimacy though and the role the state has in formalizing (institutionalizing) customary legal
judgements is still central to Somaliland’s legal culture.
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The everyday - particularly everyday justice and security—as an analytic lens delves
more deeply into community social realities than does transitional justice (which tends to be a
top-down approach) to examine dynamic social networks and bonds as actively shaping legal
norms and values. To account for this impact, transitional justice theories have expanded to
include social transformation, a goal that seeks to bring in local approaches to justice into formal
and informal processes during the transitional justice process. Consider the way that
transformative justice as an approach has gained prominence over time. Transformative justice
seeks to redirect our attention towards forms of violence and social hierarchies that are
detrimental to sustainable peace. Seeking social transformation through justice-sector reform
means that the focus is on communities and localized approaches to achieve social
transformation rather than relying on international legal norms and the state to mandate rights
and mitigate against social exclusion. Transformative justice seeks to make visible issues of
inequality that may remain invisible during transitional justice processes that do not
meaningfully take into account ‘everyday’ social relations and their impact on violence in postconflict societies. To the extent that the everyday is taken for granted as a reality rather than as
the site where social change can emerge can lead to stalled reform endeavours (legal and
political) in post-conflict societies.202 After all, why engage in legal reform that may not impact
‘everyday life’ in a significant way when the delivery of justice and security are already taking
place (i.e., by communities or customary authorities). Discursively linking the experience of
everyday life to institutional legal reform is valuable and necessary to achieve sustainable peace.
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Transitional Justice to Transformative Justice: Accounting for ‘everyday’ interactions
My analysis of the Somaliland case offers some insights for the literature on transitional
justice. The broader literature encompasses both critical and normative approaches to
establishing rule of law and recognizes that states emerging from conflict will have varying legal
capacities. Somaliland’s stalled legal reform process does not imply that rule of law is absent
entirely nor that it is less effective by Western legal standards. Instead, given the plurality of
legal systems that exist and the strength of customary legal approaches, a new understanding
must be established in the delivery of justice. Crossing disciplinary boundaries, transitional
justice is a significant feature of peacebuilding literature and the concept of a ‘just peace’ alludes
to an aspiration of a kind of peacebuilding (as a process) that takes into account formal and
informal approaches to justice and security in post-conflict societies. 203
As noted, with transitional justice approaches seen as partly aspirational in nature 204,
notions of inclusion, equity and accountability must be seen as tangible goals for those
participating in transitional justice initiatives. Otherwise, reinforcing pre-conflict social
hierarchies is almost inevitable in post-conflict contexts. Gready and Robins (2014) suggest that
an entirely new approach to justice in post-conflict contexts is necessary given the lack of
societal ‘transformation’ in transitional justice practices to date. Transformative justice is a
proposed approach –not to displace transitional justice – that encapsulates the way in which we
speak about the everyday including occurrences of everyday violence.
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Gready and Robins (2014) define transformative justice as:
…transformative change that emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of
process rather than preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal and
intersecting power relationships and structures of exclusions at both the local and the
global level. While transformative justice does not seek to completely dismiss or replace
transitional justice, it does seek to radically reform its policies, [the] local and priorities.
Transformative justice entails a shift in focus from the legal to the social and political,
and from the state and institutions to communities and everyday concerns.205
The need for radical social transformation is necessary and appropriate in the face of human
rights violations and abuses during conflict. The need for transitional justice initiatives grew out
of the recognition that forms of legal accountability were needed to ensure that perpetrators of
violence were held accountable. But many pointed out that reconciliatory approaches, localized
knowledge and community-building practices were ignored in this legal approach, particularly
noting the rise of customary legal applications of justice in post-conflict African states. Gready
and Robins (2014) ask us to shift our focus entirely to the role that ‘justice’ ought to serve – as a
part of a larger package of social transformation. This does not entirely do away with legalistic
approaches to justice but complements it. Especially as we dispel the notion that transitions in
post-conflict contexts are fixed, and begin to see them as dynamic and fluid. Indeed,
Somaliland’s ‘transition’ to effective legal institutions is certainly ongoing. Moreover,
transitional justice as a holistic approach emphasizes that justice is an unequal experience for
many of society’s most marginalized. Everyday violence is seen as a part of the continuum of
violence rather than limited to political violence.206 In a hybridized political environment with
plural legal practices, the everyday is an appropriate lens to apply to all the interactions that
occur at the community level to elevate our approach to everyday violence with the
understanding that all forms of violence are a legal matter. Sexual and gender-based violence for

205
206

Gready and Robins 2014, p. 339
Ibid, p. 343

89

example is one realm in which sharia and customary laws in Somaliland often treat it not as a
legal issue but as part of personal and family matters. In the case of rape, what occurs in practice
it that customary authorities seek a negotiated settlement that often sees women compelled to
marry their rapists.207
To advance this transformational approach in transitional justice, Gready and Robins
(2014) articulate an “actor-oriented approach” to human rights that situates them in local
struggles for emancipation.208 The aim here is to view the pursuit of greater socio-economic
rights as foundational to any post-conflict societies engagement with justice-sector reform.
Localized knowledge and contexts are magnified as the cure to, as well as the source of violence.
Gready and Robins (2014) have meaningfully approached the distinction between localizing
rights-based “consciousness” as opposed to imposing it from the outside (i.e., international
human rights regimes),209; situating rights through an actor-oriented approach may answer the
question of ‘who is responsible’? but narrow the view on ‘who is accountable’? The state has a
role to play in expanding on the view of who is accountable? The state as a ‘force of law’ can
ensure the enforcement of what Lambourne (2013) terms as the pursuit of “political justice.”
Seen as:
…necessary to ensur[ing] the successful implementation of transitional justice measures
including institutional reform, rule of law and respect for human rights, addressing
socioeconomic needs, and avoiding the appearance of victor’s justice or a culture of
impunity…political justice requires delinking of political identity from cultural identity
and a move towards democracy that involves institutional reform, and separates and
makes accountable the powers of the executive, legislature, judiciary and
administration….without political justice, transformative justice is therefore incomplete
and peace unsustainable. 210
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Dichotomies (institution/community; local/international; state law/customary law) feature
heavily in much of the critique surrounding transitional justice as a normative approach. Owing
to the relevance of the post-conflict rebuilding of political and legal institutions, the weight of
delivering justice, however imperfect, has rested with the state since the state is seen as the
source of legitimacy in international law. However, the rise of critical analysis including the
‘everyday’ as an analytical lens, transformative approaches to transitional justice, as well as the
emphasis on local knowledge has reshaped our approach to justice and security-sector reform in
significant ways. Given the anecdotal and empirical evidence emerging from post-conflict
African states, legal pluralism has enabled communities in conflict to assert agency while
impacting on formal political and legal institutions.

Connecting the Global & Local: Somaliland and legal reform
In conflict-affected societies the notion that everyday justice and security are fluid
concepts and practices may be taken for granted and usher a period of sustained ‘transition.’
Reforms and social transformation initiatives may be put on hold or stalled in favour of stability
in the form of a centralized government and stagnant laws. This is why aspects of everyday life
become central to micro-level analysis of transitional justice processes after the conflict has
ended. Everyday life is imbued with elements that are central to our existence but rarely
analysed; these include our “emotions, interactions, tensions, power struggles, tactics of
domination and resistance and small and big ceremonial routine events…”211 Everyday life is
magnified in conflict and post-conflict contexts and requires focused and determined analysis.
Legal transformation may also take some time to emerge when taken up by the state, whereas
local communities embody these transformations in much more dynamic ways. To legitimize
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these localized understandings of norms and values hybrid forms of governance (i.e., customary
and state laws) are crucial to challenging the “technocratic turn” that transitional justice and
peacebuilding by extension, have taken.212 Yet while hybridity as a practice may be able to
support the diffuse ways that social groups organize legally and politically it can also reinforce
hierarchies to the detriment of less powerful groups.
In order to counter the globalized, top-down technocratic approaches to peacebuilding
and transitional justice (courts, prosecutions, peace agreements, settlements), viewing
communities through the lens of everyday life means embracing the multitude forms of social
organizing (formal and informal). Global and local approaches do not exist in separate spheres
but also reinforce one another. The institutionalization of localized forms of justice is another
process through which transitional justice, as a top-down exercise, reasserts itself on
communities. Communities are routinely mined for their perspective and labour. Local
knowledge consistently flows upward to institutions rather than being seen as a process that is
“difficult, restless and [full of] unceasing negotiation.”213 Transitional justice processes that stem
from international actors and international humanitarian laws often dismiss this crucial process
of contested reconciliation.214 This dismissal or institutionalization of local approaches has led to
distinct forms of governance and legal values and norms that compete for dominance or are
loosely bound together. While legal scholars recognize hybridity and legal pluralism as valuable
to ending conflict and rebuilding institutions, they tend to be overlooked in the implementation
side of things. And, if legal institutions become the sole source of law-making, the important
contribution of local knowledge production to that process, can be obscured or even dismissed.
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As Kent (2018) emphasizes, the focus on institutions leads legal scholars to see only that which
is “recognisably law like, such as customary dispute resolution practices” pieced together to
frame a body of practices as ‘customary laws.’215
Consequently, categories of distinct actors, processes and ideologies that co-exist in the
transitional justice space may not be adequately measured or understood. Consider that everyday
life operates at micro-level sites on macro-level processes/institutions; it can be challenging to
assess the impact of local forms of justice or view the law as emerging from local sites in
dynamic ways. Moreover, as conflict emerges, categories of perpetrator/victim become
increasingly reified in post-conflict settings that dismiss violence committed across many fronts.
For Kent (2018) these categories seem necessary in order to justify the work of transitional
justice processes as a break from the ‘violent past’ towards the ‘peaceful future.’216 Rather, legal
scholars may be better served with approaching legal reform through the prism of ongoing
processes of reconciliation and conflict-resolution. More importantly, focusing on the everyday
allows the scholar to view local actors as progenitors of legal norms since “the everyday is not a
level of human organization but rather [a] dimension of human experience.”217 This means that
some social actors at the community level may never seek to reconcile grievances but rather
negotiate forms of power-sharing that are mutually beneficial. The everyday may be a site for
radical social transformation and legal reform that lead to conflict resolution and peace. Yet it is
also the site at which violence is reproduced and enacted as social hierarchies are reinforced on a
daily basis.218
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Legal reform in the context of a legally pluralistic environment can be made all the more
difficult when conflict arises and uncovers deeply unequal social relationships. Rebuilding with
the understanding that laws are reflective of social norms and values means taking a critical lens
on pre-conflict legal systems. As the everyday reframes our focus on the role that communities
play in shaping legal norms and post-conflict institutions, similarly initiating legal reform with
the need to reconcile customary, state and religiously derived legal norms may be reflective of
the power of local actors; even if these actors are embedded in social institutions that perpetuate
inequality in personal and public ways (i.e., clan/kin networks). Hybridity as a concept
recognizes the negative role that local power dynamics can have on shaping political and legal
norms while accepting that communities are also the seat of authority for non-state actors.
Ideally, hybrid regimes offer pathways to compromise for post-conflict societies that
have strong foundations for legal pluralism.219 Somaliland is an example of the ways in which
legal pluralism continues to have an enduring impact on social relations while also serving as the
foundation for statebuilding. The ‘everyday’ is an appropriate lens to utilize in this context [for
assessing the success of transitional justice efforts, especially considering legal reform in the
context of Somaliland’s [transitional justice] experience is very much still ongoing. With
customary laws (xeer) maintaining a prominent role in Somaliland’s reform process,
communities and clan/kin networks must be central to any proposed legal reform.
There is no way to orchestrate hybridized regimes that benefit from local authorities’
knowledge and legitimacy. Nor is there a means to derive a balance between competing legal
systems, particularly in post-conflict settings. Why then, am I placing such emphasis then on
hybrid regimes, ‘the everyday’ and their relationship to legal reform? First, Moe (2011) asks us
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to recognize that “international intervention strategies” (including transitional justice initiatives)
are forms of hybridity.220 Interventions include international humanitarian laws shaped by
colonial and neocolonial encounters between “…Western and European rulers with people and
communities in the Global South.”221 As such, local communities that resist and challenge these
interventions (ideologically and practically) ingratiate indigenous forms of power and order that
exist alongside Western-influenced legal systems.222 Moe (2011) offers some examples of ‘the
everyday’ that is common in post-conflict African societies including “small-scale patron-client
exchanges, [largely] subsistence economies, family and kin protection networks, as well as [the
dominance of] customary law and authority.” 223 The everyday then becomes a means to
understanding the various levels of compromise and contestation in a legally pluralistic
environment. This is particularly so in Somaliland where a return to British common law is seen
as a means to reassert independence from Somalia.
Including customary law (xeer) and sharia law as foundations for the post-1991
Somaliland state is to deviate from liberal peacebuilding norms (including transitional justice).224
Including customary approaches to resolving conflict is unavoidable and lends greater credence
to the notion that the community (clan/kin networks) more significantly inform legal and
political reform rather than state authorities (who are members of these networks and structures).
Xeer as derived from clan families and tradition is more acutely applied at the local level but
Moe (2011) cautions us against the ‘local’ as “territorially bound” but rather to view the ‘local’
as “empirical, but not territorially fixed, relational sites of contestation, repulsion, reshaping and

220

MacGinty 2019; Moe 2011
Moe supra note 219 at 150
222
Ibid
223
Ibid
224
Ibid
221

95

accommodation between international, liberal, state-based agendas and local agencies, customs
and practices” (my emphasis). Without approaching these, often nuanced, interactions between
the state and local communities, it becomes quite difficult to assemble a rationale for legal
reform in a post-conflict context without identifying the basis upon which ‘reform’ is grounded.
Otherwise, state-centric approaches to legal reform and justice can exclude local experiences and
knowledge.
In the Somaliland context, the addition of xeer (customary law) as a part of its transitional
justice process and constitution is that rationale. Xeer is seen as an antidote to the violence and
conflict of the Somali civil war, and Somaliland’s approach to peacebuilding through customary
approaches has given emphasis to reconciliation among communities and clan families.
Historically utilized as a dispute resolution mechanism, forming a legal order on the basis of xeer
is difficult as it lacks a written form and has been transmitted largely as an oral tradition. As
well, xeer is still inaccessible for many legal advocates since the authority resides in only a few
types of adjudicators (male, elderly, morally upright). The need for a common/civil law adjacent
to xeer in this sense becomes necessary and imperative when the aim is to promote greater
pluralism in society. Moreover, recognizing that international laws are themselves already
hybridized (international and local legal approaches and rationale). This may partly be due to a
“…recognition that transplanting liberal and rational-legal political institutions turned out not to
work as smoothly as suggested by past optimistic democratization scenarios.”225
The resurgence of ‘local approaches’ as well as ‘the everyday’ as an analytical lens is due
to the scholarly privilege that western-legal systems have in shaping post-conflict societies. Until
the rise of transitional justice that saw the establishment of hybrid forms of legal governance in
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the 1990s as African states mired in conflict engaged in reform, local knowledge was set aside as
irrelevant. This “ontological narrowness” has missed a variety of experiences occurring at the
local/community level that heavily influences institutional legal practices.226
As noted, Somaliland’s criminal cases are diverted to customary courts and take the form
of arbitration between the two parties. Not to dismiss formal courts entirely, the “settlements
[that are] reached through the customary system are in some cases registered and filed” in effect
formalizing decisions emerging from customary courts.227 The everydayness of this is evident in
the process or informal procedures that dominate the relationship between formal and informal
legal practice are taken as a given. The police forces are responsible for diverting suspects to
customary authorities who conduct proceedings in the hopes of reaching a negotiated settlement
between two parties (representatives from corresponding clan families). The emphasis on
‘negotiating settlements’ is directly related to the threat of violence by both clan families in
escalating the dispute. Nor are government courts seen as neutral actors in these disputes where
even business-related cases are taken up by customary authorities.
The lack of effective reform in the common law area is one significant barrier to cases
being brought forth in these courts but also the customary authorities are seen as less politicised
than judges in the formal courts.228 While this is certainly debated by individuals who are often
marginalized by customary laws, the dual-track use of formal and informal courts has proven
effective in maintaining localized security, dispelling small-scale conflicts, and ensuring
accountability at the community-level. Nevertheless, the justice and security-sector reforms that
may have driven progress towards increasing democratization and inclusion (2000-2010) has
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stalled. While security is a necessary precondition to effective governance, it has displaced the
aspirational attributes of Somaliland’s transitional justice in the early peace process. Moe (2011)
reminds us that “…security is a precondition for the undertaking of several other activities
necessary for the consolidation of political order” and this perspective continues to dominate
Somaliland’s legal reform approach. 229 To the detriment of its citizens, this practice merely
serves to underscore the stagnant nature of Somaliland’s legal reform project (a legacy of its
transitional justice process) where basic forms of governance including security and the delivery
of justice are satisfied. Still, ordinary Somalilanders engage with these institutions and practices
by seeking to make also make them more equitable recognising that peace and security cannot be
achieved in the absence of social, political and economic equality.

Conclusion
This paper has highlighted the way that complex legal systems interact with one another
to shape Somaliland’s peace and stability. To understand this complexity, I have utilized the key
concepts of ‘everyday life’ and ‘hybridity’ as frameworks of analysis that allow me to better
understand the process of legal reform ongoing since the early 1990s. Somaliland’s early peace
process was significant in bringing to light the need to take local knowledge more seriously as a
foundation for building sustainable peace. As well, transitional justice scholars are approaching
post-conflict societies in more nuanced ways by thinking critically of the top-down nature of
international processes. This has involved discussions of whether hybrid approaches could be
more fruitful for bringing about long-lasting peace. Throughout this thesis, I have argued that the
role of community is key here to building legitimate institutions and cannot be persistently
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displaced to favour international legal instruments. It is by privileging community-building and
local forms of knowledge that we can see more easily the role that everyday life –interactions
and contestations, play in shaping social and legal norms in Somaliland. These everyday
practices are helping to shape customary norms/laws. Xeer is continually evolving and there are
certainly groups that are pushing for greater inclusivity in shaping it.
Researching Somaliland’s experience with transitional justice continues to raise questions
about the way that justice, peace and security are conceptualized in post-conflict societies.
Similar to many other African states emerging from conflict we see the use of customary and
international legal instruments to end small and large conflicts but to also negotiate new social
and political bonds. Throughout this paper, the recognition that global/local processes are
experienced through hybrid forms of governance speaks to the connectedness that embodies
peace and the everyday experience of it. The concerns are plenty though and chief among them
is the lack of inclusion for marginalized groups including women and minority clans in
Somaliland when it comes to justice and security-sector reform.
Clan elders (largely male) drove these early peace processes using xeer and as such the
judiciary and security-sector institutions reflect their concerns and authority. However, by
recognizing shariah as a foundational legal framework and enshrining it in the constitution; by
utilizing the common law system to offer hybrid political forms of order, Somaliland’s early
peacebuilders established broad frameworks for social and political inclusion. Xeer rulings are
contested from time to time and particularly by marginalized groups including women and
minority clans in Somaliland. In fact, women’s organisations have actively advocated for shariah
laws to be applied to issues surrounding family matters (since they view it as more progressive).
Finally, political leaders and elite perpetually engage in processes of reform (though discursive)
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and that has led to the 2019 Police bill that, while limited, has brought to the forefront the need
to frame Somaliland’s security-sector institutions in more democratic terms. These are all
examples of movements for social and political change driven by community. This suggests that
Somaliand’s legal pluralism and reform continues to evolve and at the center of these
experiences are everyday interactions between diverse groups –that are still connected through a
community of clan/kin networks.
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